State Responsibility for Failure to Control the Export of Weapons of Mass Destruction by Rubenstein, Paul
STATE RESPONSIBILITY FOR FAILURE TO CONTROL THE
EXPORT OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION
PAUL RUBENSTIlN*
INTRODUCTION
In acquiring a multi-billion dollar arsenal of modem non conventional
weaponry from both the former USSR and private Western companies in the
decade prior to the Gulf War,' Iraq propelled itself into a military position
that enabled it to wreak havoc on both Kuwait and Israel as well as threaten
global peace and security. The purpose of this article is to explain how this
situation arose and then to present a legal analysis of whether the failure of
the former USSR or relevant Western states2 to prevent the transfer of these
weapons to Iraq constituted "wrongfulness" in the sense prescribed by either
Articles 3 or 27 of the Draft Articles on State Responsibility adopted by the
International Law Commission (ILC)3 or constituted "indirect aggression."
* Bse. LL.B (Hons.) (Monash University).
1. The combined value of conventional and non conventional acquisitions was $50 billion.
See Michael Ledeen, Iraq's German Connection, 91 COMMENTARY 27 (1991).
2. Subsequently referred to as "supplier states."
3. Documents of the 32nd Session (1980), 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 14, 30-34, U.N. Doe.
A.CN.4/SER.A/1980/Add. 1 [hereinafter Draft Articles]. The International Law Commission's
role as outlined by Article 13(l)(a) of the U.N. Charter is to encourage the "progressive
development of international law and its codification." Yet, the nature of its work as a source
of international law in general is unsettled. See IAN SINCLAIR, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW
COMMISSION 121-38 (1987). Some deny that it can be a source at all (citing Maarten Bos, id.
at 22). Others are reserved in their opinion that "any appreciation of the work of the
commission as a body of publicists has to be made on an individual basis, rule by rule," (quoting
Ramcharan, id.). But there are those who view its work as being at least as equivalent to the
status of the writings of the most highly qualified publicists (citing Parry, id. at 121). However,
it is significant that many see the ILC as being even more important than this. For example,
Jennings sees it as "law-shaping machinery of actual as well as political importance, which has
already reached a stage of considerable sophistication." (citing Jennings, id at 123). And Viliger
declares that "the close ties between the Commission and the States lend to these materials a
special status going beyond that of studies of learned writers.... As a result, because [they]
constitute the basis and departing point for states engaging in practice and ultimately for the
consolidation of existing, or the development of new, customary law, they are essential for the
understanding of the customary rule." (quoting Villager, id. at 124).
More specifically, with respect to its codification of State Responsibility in the Draft
Articles, because the ILC has adopted a "secondary rules" approach (see infra note 9) rather
than attempting to codify "primary rules" (see infra note 5), it has been suggested by some that
it deserves little attention. See Richard Lillich, The Current Status of the Law of State
Responsibility for Injuries to Aliens in State Responsibility, Self-Help and International Law, 73
AM. SOC. INT'L L. PROC. 244, 24647 (1979). However, since it is "easier to achieve
international agreement on broad organizing principles rather than specific rules, the secondary
rules approach lends itself to consensus building" as well as providing "a broad conceptual
framework containing uniform and straight forward requirements." See Sterling Scott, Codifica-
tion of State Responsibility in International Law: A Review and an Assessment, 9 ASILS INT'L
L.J. 1, 26 (1985). Moreover, Judge Schwebel in describing Article 27 of the Draft Articles as
illustrating "elemental aspects of accepted international law" in his dissenting opinion in Nicara-
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Article 3 states: "There is an internationally wrongful act of a state when:
(a) conduct consisting of an action or omission is attributable to the state
under international law; and (b) that conduct constitutes a breach of an
international obligation of the state."
Wrongfulness under Article 3 in the present case, therefore, depends first
upon the existence4 of an international obligation that binds states to
prevent the transfer of weapons of mass destruction6 either erga omnes7 or
merely to some states,' and secondly, upon conduct consisting of acts or
omissions, attributable to the state, which constitute the breach of that
obligation.9
Alternatively, where a state's conduct is not in itself wrongful under
Article 3, but merely aids another state's "wrongful act" under Article 3 or
act of aggression as defined by the U.N. Charter, 10 then it is appropriate to
apply Article 27 and the notion of indirect aggression. The relevance of both
of these concepts with regard to Iraq and its acquisitions of weapons of mass
destruction will be analyzed below.
Further, the article will examine the nature of any international legal
responsibility that would be owed to Kuwait and Israel as a consequence of
any of these outcomes. This will involve an analysis of the available
remedies, as well as a discussion of the appropriate forums in which they
might be received.
Before proceeding to this analysis some explanation is required as to why
this article focuses only on non-conventional weaponry and only on the role
of states instead of individual persons or companies. The focus on non-
conventional weapons derives from their qualitative difference to other types
of weapons. In distinct contrast to conventional arms, international law has
continually expressed the need to regulate their proliferation as well as the
gua v. U.S., 1984 I.C.I. 4, 219, thereby recognized the importance of the ILC's work.
In this article the Draft Articles are utilized as a general framework as they are accepted
by many as reflective of international law and they provide us with an intelligent basis for the
articulation of both primary and secondary roles.
4. It must be shown to be in existence at the time of its purported breach. See Draft Article,
supra note 3, at 18.
5. Such an obligation is often referred to as a "primary rule" of international law.
6. Weapons of mass destruction, interchangeable with the term non-conventional weaponry,
is defimed as: "nuclear weapons and any other weapon which may produce comparable effects,
such as chemical weapons and biological weapons," 1990 SIPRI YEARBOOK: WORLD
ARMAMENTS AND DISARMAMENT xx (1990) [hereinafter SIPRI Y.B.]. As it is increasingly
common to include ballistic missiles in this category as well (see, e.g., Gulf War Cease Fire
Agreement, U.N. Security Council Res. 687 (Apr. 3, 1991, reprinted in 45 Yearbook of the
United Nations 172 (1991), weapons of mass destruction includes ballistic missiles for the
purpose of this article.
7. In other words to all states. Subsequently referred to as the "broad" obligation.
8. Principally to those states where it is reasonably foreseeable that they will be used
aggressively. Subsequently referred to as the "narrow" obligation.
9. These requirements, often referred to as "secondary roles," form the subject matter of
both the Draft Articles and III, infra.
10. U.N. CHARTER, art. 2, 4.
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mass destruction, they are designed to cause immense and widespread
damage and users have no capacity to discriminate between military and
civilian targets. The focus on the role of the state derives from our
contemporary international political context which totally prohibits the
aggressive use of force in international relations." Friedmann asserts that:
No modem government has found it impossible to enact the necessary
measures of control over private enterprise where over-riding objectives of
national or international policies so require. The power of governments to
impose drastic restrictions on the personal lives and activities of its citizens
and organizations in time of war is nowhere disputed and it was drastically
applied by all belligerents in World War H.2
Similarly, a comparable modern day "over-riding objective" is the
avoidance of aggression. As the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction
implies an increased risk of such an outcome, it correlates with a need to
widen the sphere of the responsibility of governments in the conduct of
international relations. It is this reality that leads to particular emphasis
being placed on the role of the state, as it is both its responsibility and in its
best interests to prevent by all available means the use of such force as a
means of international dispute settlement.
I. THE FACTUAL CONTEXT
Before engaging in any legal analysis of wrongfulness and indirect
aggression it is necessary to outline the factual context of this discussion.
This involves detailing the means by which Iraq procured its enormous non-
conventional weapons arsenal in the decade prior to the Gulf War.13 This also
involves discussing the level of awareness of and involvement in these
weapons dealings by the governments of supplier states, and a discussion of
the damage suffered during the Gulf War, as a consequence of these procure-
ments.
11. Id.
12. WOLFGANG FRIEDMANN, THE CHANGING STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 273
(1964).
13. During that period, while Iraq was engaged in the Iran-Iraq War (September 1980-June
1988) most argued that Western interests were best represented by supporting Iraq, so as to
prevent the spread of fundamentalist Shiite Islam "westward" from Iran. Yet, however valid
these political motivations were, they are of no legal worth considering that for the greater part
of that decade most export control regimes were fully functional and there were repeated calls
for their strengthening. For example, as far back as November 1982, President Reagan signed
National Security Decision Directive 70, seeking ways to combat the "dangerous trend" of
missile proliferation. See Don Oberdrfer, U.S. Bid to Halt Missile Spread, SYDNEY MORNING
HERALD, Sept. 8, 1988, at 7.
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A. Non-Conventional Arms Procurements
Iraq acquired its non-conventional armaments and components by using
a network of front companies in the U.S. and Europe, 4 which operated to
contravene the Western system of export controls over sophisticated
technology. Specifically, Iraq pursued highly developed military programs
with respect to each of the four weapons of mass destruction: biological
weapons, chemical weapons, nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles. (See
Appendix). Each will now be examined in turn.
1. Biological Weapons
By the end of 1988, Iraq's biological warfare" program was capable of
producing certain toxins in military quantities.' 6 The Reagan Administration
had discovered Iraq's capabilities by 1989,'" however Iraq continued to vehe-
mently deny the program's existence.
Of greater importance for present purposes is not the scale or capacity
of Iraq's biological weapons facilities but the means by which they were
achieved. Principally, assistance was received from a number of West
German 8 companies in the building of a biological weapon "factory" at
Salman Pak near Baghdad.' 9 The findings of the U.N. Commission charged
with eliminating Iraq's weapons of mass destruction after the Gulf War'
have confirmed this, as well as, the fact that the facility had the capacity to
produce in excess of 230 liters of Anthrax each week, an amount capable of
contaminating approximately 1500 square kilometers. This same plant also
14. Ledeen, Iraq's German Connection, supra note 1, at 27. See also special report
commissioned by the Simon Wiesenthal Centre for Med. News 1990, at 1 [hereinafter The
Wiesenthal Report] (on file with author). 207 Western companies were engaged in the supply
of weaponry to Iraq.
15. Biological warfare can be defined as the intentional use or manufacture by culture or
cloning of disease producing viruses, bacteria, fungi, insects, or toxins produced by these
organisms, for the purpose of causing disease or death to humans, animals and plants. See
Leonard S. Wolfe, Chemical and Biological Warfare: Medical Effects and Consequences, 28
MCGILL L.J. 733, 741 (1983). Examples of bacteria known to be used for biological warfare
are Cholera, Typhoid and Anthrax. An example of a toxin synthesized by one of these organisms
is Botulinum Toxin which is extraordinarily toxic to mankind-as little as one microgram (one
thousandth of a gram) is sufficient to cause fatal paralysis of the respiratory muscles. See JAMES
CROSSLAND, LEwIS' PHARMACOLOGY 236 (5th ed. 1980).
16. Anthony H. Cordesman, Creating Weapons of Mass Destruction, ARMED FORCES
JOURNAL INT'L, 56 (Feb. 1989).
17. Iraq Building Germ Weapons says U.S., SYDNEY MORNING HERALD, Jan. 19, 1989, at7.
18. Now that East and West Germany have reunified subsequent references are merely to
"Germany."
19. The company allegedly involved is Karl Kolb, the same company tied to the chemical
weapons factory at Samarra. See infra note 29.
20. This was formed under the auspices of the Gulf War Cease Fire Agreement. See supra
note 6, 9(b).
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had the ability to produce Botulinum toxin in "vast quantities." 21 In
addition to the assistance in building the factory, the Iraqis obtained toxins
from a small German firm located in Neustadt Am Rubenberge. 2 Also, in
1989, the U.S. Centers for Disease Control (CDC) sent three shipments of
West Nile Fever Virus to Iraq claiming that at the time of export, it believed
the organisms would be used for research.'
Despite the extent of Iraq's biological weapon program, even greater
efforts were concentrated on other non-conventional weapons.
2. Chemical Weapons'
Iraq's capacity to produce chemical weapons was well documented as
early as 1983.' In a statement made in 1989, William H. Webster,
Director of the CIA, indicated that Iraq had produced "several thousand tons
of chemical agents," and had used them extensively during the Iran-Iraq War
and against the Iraqi Kurdish population after the ceasefire of June 1988.
More importantly, however, Webster gave evidence that:
From the inception of Iraq's chemical weapons program, firms and
individuals from Western Europe were key to the supply of chemical
process equipment, chemical precursors and technical expertise. West
Europeans remained at Samarra after it began operations. But after several
years of experience in producing chemical weapons, Irag's well established
effort is now far less dependent on foreign assistance.
Samarra, referred to by Webster, is a complex about 70 kilometers north
west of Baghdad built to produce Mustard gas and the two Nerve agents
Tabun and Sarin.2 In addition, there are two other main chemical weapon
production sites located at Fallujah and Akashat, 2 which, as Webster
indicated and according to other intelligence reports, were built for the Iraqis
21. U.N. finds Iraqis Made Anthrax, Aug. 16, 1991, THE AGE, at 9.
22. The toxins involved were the fungal myco toxins TH-2 and T-2, which can ultimately
cause death by wide spread hemorrhaging. See The Wiesenthal Report, supra note 14, at 9.
23. First reported by NBC News on April 11, 1990.
24. Chemical weapons as opposed to biological weapons involve the use of synthetic
chemical substances such as Mustard gas, Nerve gas, Phosgene, Sarin and Tabun which are also
designed to kill and incapacitate humans, animals and plants. Their potential to devastate is also
horrifying. For example, one milligram (one tenth of a gram) of nerve gas is enough to kill a
human being. By extrapolation, the amount of nerve gas in a one liter Coca-Cola bottle could
kill ten thousand people. See W. Seth Cams, Chemical Weapons in the Middle East, 9 POUCY
FOCUS 1 (1989).
25. See Missile Proliferation in the Third World, Testimony of W. Seth Cams, Fellow,
Washington Institute for Near East Policy-before the U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee,
Sub-Committee on Defence Industry and Technology, May 2, 1989, at 3 (on file with author).
26. Testimony of William H. Webster, Director of the CIA before the Senate Committee
on Government Affairs, Hearings on the Global Spread of chemical weapons and biological
weapons, Sept. 2, 1989, at 12 (on file with author).
27. Id.
28. The Wiesenthal Report, supra note 14, at 7.
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by a number of European (principally German) companies.' This has now
been verified by the report of the U.N. Commission which also described a
chemical weapons plant at Mutthana as probably being the third largest
chemical weapon facility in the world. The inspectors were told the plant
could produce 2.5 tons of Sarin and 5 tons of Mustard gas every day. At the
last count, the Commission had discovered 46,000 chemical weapons, among
them 30 Nerve gas tipped Scud missiles of the Al-Hussein variety, capable
of reaching Israel.' However in addition to these manufacturing facilities,
Iraq acquired from Western companies3" both the precursor 2 chemicals
essential for the production of chemical weapons and a plant capable of their
production.33 It is important to realize at this point, that all of these precur-
sor chemicals are on the list of chemicals prohibited from export under the
"Australia Group" Regime.'
It is clear, therefore, that the Iraqi Government was able to set up a vast
chemical weapons manufacturing capability through the import of both
manufacturing technology and precursor chemicals from Western companies.
3. Nuclear Weapons
Perhaps even more elaborate were Iraq's attempts to obtain nuclear
weapons. A nuclear facility-albeit for supposedly peaceful purposes-was
first pursued in 1974 when discussions took place between the then French
Premier Jacques Chirac and Saddam Hussein. These discussions resulted in
the partial production of the 'Osiraq' reactor which was later destroyed by
the Israeli Air Force in June 1981, just prior to completion.35 Yet despite
this setback, Iraq became even more determined to establish a comprehensive
nuclear weapons program.
29. The companies primarily responsible for constructing the plants at Samarra were
identified as Karl Kolb and its subsidiary Pilot Plant See P. Harris & P. Woolwich, The Secrets
of Samarra (BBC), a Panorama television documentary aired in Britain on Oct. 27, 1986. See
also Michael Ledeen, The Curious Case of Chemical Warfare, 88 Commentary 37-41 (1989)
[hereinafter Ledeen, Chemical Warfare]. The Plant at Akashat was completed in 1983, and
appears to have been built with the aid of Italian chemical giant, Mont Edison. See Herbert
Krosney Iraq Making Deadly Form of Nerve Agent, JERUSALEM POST, Nov. 24, 1986, at 11 (on
file with author).
30. Leonard Doyle, The Secrets of Iraq's Biggest Chemical-Warfare Factory, THE AGE,
Aug. 5, 1991, at 1.
31. It was alleged that 500 tons of Thiodyglycol manufactured in Belgium was shipped to
Iraq illegally. See Michael R. Gordon, U.S. Companies Ried to Chemical Sales, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 30, 1989, at 3, col. 4.
32. For example, to produce Mustard gas the essential precursor is Thiodyglycol.
33. This plant was run under the auspices of SEPP (State Establishment for the Production
of Pesticides) and was built by German companies. In November 1987, the German Government
intervened to prevent a German company from completing the facility but all the production
equipment was delivered to Iraq before this action was taken. The companies involved were
WTB and Infraplan. See DER SPIEGEL, Jan. 23, 1989, at 9.
34. See infra note 118 and accompanying text.
35. Disputed target in the desert, TIME, June 22, 1981, at 14.
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Its strategy was to first obtain the two alternative types of fissile -
material required for a nuclear bomb: plutonium and uranium. Plutonium"
is a non-natural material which results as a by-product of the irradiation of
U-23835 in a nuclear reactor. Even after the destruction of Osiraq, there
were still widely held suspicions,39 which were confirmed by the U.N.
Commission, that Iraq continued to pursue this option.'
The production of a uranium bomb on the other hand is a more difficult
engineering feat, as it requires 15-20 kilograms of "enriched uranium."41
It was already known that Iraq was in possession of approximately 40
kilograms of such material that was under the supervision of the International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).42 However, in order to enrich its own
natural uranium, Iraq secretly obtained the technology required for the gas
centrifuge43 and electro-magnetic enrichment" techniques that it began to
employ. Apart from the fissile material, Iraq also tried to acquire the other
advanced technological components required to actually detonate a bomb.
36. This is material whose atoms can easily split, scattering tiny fast moving particles called
neutrons, which hit the nuclei of neighboring atoms and split them, unleashing still more
neutrons, which in turn cause more break ups, all of which release energy. In a nuclear reactor,
this process is controlled, but in a bomb the process is speeded up to produce a nuclear
explosion. See Frederic Golden, The ABC's of A-Bomb Making, TIME, June 22, 1981, at 19.
37. About 5-10 kilograms are needed to manufacture a plutonium bomb. See FRANK
BARNABY, THE INviSiBLE BOMB 170 (1989).
38. Natural Uranium contains two isotopes, Uranium 235 (U-235) and Uranium 238 (U-
238). The former is the fissile material required for a bomb, yet it is the rarer comprising only
.7% of naturally mined uranium.
39. For example, it was argued that the excessive quantity of U-238 imported from Portugal,
Brazil and Nigeria in the mid 1980s for supposed use in "research" activities could only have
been meant for plutonium production. See Timothy L.H. McCormack, Israel's Bombing of the
Iraqi Nuclear Reactor and Self-Defence in International Law (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Law
Library, Monash University, 1989) (on file with author).
40. It revealed that Iraq admitted to having extracted three grams of plutonium from spent
fuel in a small research reactor. See Jerry Gray, Iraqi Plutonium Disclosure Troubles U.N., THE
AGE, Aug. 7, 1991, at 7. Yet most still believe this figure to be highly underestimated. See
Michael Wise, Experts to Disclose Iraqi Nuclear Supplier, THE AGE, Aug. 23, 1991, at 6.
41. "Enriched uranium" contains a much higher percentage of U-235, which is required,
since to explode a uranium bomb, the U-235 must be relatively pure, preferably 90%. The
higher the content of U-235, the easier it is to make a bomb. By way of comparison,
commercial U.S. reactors contain only 3% U-235. See Golden, supra note 36, at 39.
42. This material was obtained from the former USSR and France. See WEISSMAN &
HERBERT KROSNEY, THE ISLAMIC BOMB 91 (1981).
43. This method requires at least 1000 sophisticated centrifuges to work together in
computer controlled concert for approximately one year to produce enough uranium for one
bomb. See BARNABY supra note 37, at 179. In mid 1987, the company H & H Metalform,
agreed to set up an entire centrifuge uranium enrichment facility in Taji, Iraq. But along with
it, other companies were involved including the Swiss manufacturer Schmiedecemeccanica and
Leifeld and Company, a machine tool builder in Ahlen, Germany. See DER SPIEGEL, Mar. 3,
1990, at 7. The U.N. inspection team also reported the discovery of a plant at AI-Farat, that
used imported technology and had the capacity to produce about 200 centrifuges annually. See
Wise, supra note 40, at 6
44. The revelation by the U.N. inspection team of two plants that would have been able to
produce 30 kilograms of enriched uranium by next year using this more cumbersome technique
is more surprising. See Wise, supra note 40, at 6.
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This is demonstrated by Iraq's failed attempt in April 1990, to import 40
"Kryton" nuclear bomb triggers.45
4. Ballistic Missiles
Aided by sizeable infusions of foreign technology and expertise, Iraq
established a modem industrial program for ballistic missile development and
production.' This involved the acquisition of both ballistic missiles and
their related technologies. The core of the Iraqi ballistic missile program
was more than 300 Scud-B missiles supplied by the former USSR.47
The best known research and development facility, Saad 16, is located
near Mosul in Northern Iraq." According to intelligence reports the
German firm Messerschmidt-Boelkow-Blohm (MBB) served as prime
contractor for the plant.49 Also, the Swiss based consortium Consen ran an
international network for the procurement of foreign expertise seeking
technology through a number of different Western companies. 50 The extent
of German involvement was later disclosed by investigations undertaken
during the Gulf War, leading Chancellor Helmut Kohl's top intelligence
adviser Lutz Stavenhagen to acknowledge that German companies helped
modify Iraq's Scud missiles in 1986-1987.5" Furthermore, Germany's
Foreign Minister, Mr. Hans Dietrich Genscher, while on a visit to Israel
during the Gulf War, confessed that he was ashamed of the role his country
had played in helping build the Iraqi war machine.52
To add a further dimension, Iraq also pursued the "supergun technolo-
gy" 53 of artillery genius, Gerard Bull. Iraq repeatedly denied such re-
ports,' however, after the Gulf War, Iraq was forced to reveal the gun to
the U.N. inspection team. The inspection team confirmed that the gun was
45. These were seized by British and U.S. customs at London's Heathrow airport. See Iraqi
Nuclear Detonating Ring Cracked, GUARDIAN WEEKLY, Apr. 8, 1990, at 6.
46. Mark Eisenstadt, The Sword of the Arabs: Iraq's Strategic Weapons, The Washington
Institute Policy Paper, No. 21 Aug. 1990, at 18 (on file with author).
47. See Cams, supra note 25, at 3.
48. Id. at 5.
49. See Eisenstadt, supra note 46, at 22.
50. The Wiesenthal Report, supra note 14, at 24.
51. He said, "German technology illegally helped to increase the range of the Scud
missiles. . . . " See German FM denies all blane, 'didn't know' about aid to Iraq, JERUSALEM
POST, Feb. 2, 1991, at 7.
52. Cameron Forbes, Holocaust's Shadow goes from Hitler to Sadaam, THE AGE, Feb. 4,
1991, at 6.
53. This technology stems from attempts in the 1960s to project missiles over long distances
and even into space. See Aiming for a Long Reach, THE MIDDLE EAST 17 (1990) (on file with
author).
54. The Iraqi Gun: Some Parts were Sent, INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE, Mar. 14-15,
1990, at 1.
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built from the type of piping which was seized in August 1990 at Heathrow
Airport and was capable of firing shells that could reach Israel. 5
B. Government Involvement and Awareness
Several governments were involved in varying degrees with Iraq's arms
acquisitions. These different levels of involvement can be summarized into
three categories:
(1) Direct involvement-i.e. governments produced weapons and
directly sold them to Iraq;
(2) Indirect involvement-i.e. governments were not involved in
manufacture but assisted in sales; and
(3) Awareness-i.e. governments were not involved in either manufac-
ture or sales assistance but were aware that sales by non government
producers were taking place.
1. Direct Involvement
Putting aside conventional weaponry, there appears to be only two
countries directly involved in non-conventional weapons sales to Iraq. 6 As
outlined above, the former USSR directly supplied Scud-B missiles which
formed the basis of Iraq's ballistic missile program. Another direct actor
was France, who in the initial stage was actively involved in establishing
Iraq's nuclear weapon capacity. In the late 1970s, France contracted with
the Iraqi government to sell enriched uranium, to build a nuclear reactor and
to train Iraqi scientists. 7 It justified its actions by arguing that since Iraq
had signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, it would honor its
commitment and would not develop nuclear weapons.58 With the benefit
of hindsight, it appears clear that this was an erroneous assumption.
2. Indirect Involvement
In the conventional arms field, several governments were heavily
involved in the negotiation of arms sales. In particular, during the late
1980s, France through the direction of its Minister for Defence, Mr.
55. Iraq lets U.N. team examine supergun, THE AGE, Aug. 14, 1991, at 8.
56. France and the former USSR supplied the backbone of Iraq's conventional armaments.
These included tanks, aircraft, air to air missiles, surface to air missiles etc. See Middle East
Military Balance 1988-1989, MILITARY POWER ENCYCLOPEDIA (New York: International
Institute For Strategic Studies) (on file with author).
57. For one of many reports, see TIME, supra note 35.
58. Traders in Terror, L.A. TIMES, July 21, 1980, at 7.
59. Principally, the former U.S.S.R. and France.
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Chevenment "led the drive to sell military hardware."' This culminated in
his January 1990 visit to Baghdad and subsequent signing of several large
conventional arms deals." However, with respect to non-conventional
Arms, government involvement appears to be limited to the category of
"Awareness."
3. Awareness
Despite denials and claims to the contrary, it seems highly unlikely that
certain governments, in particular the German government, did not have
awareness of these dealings.62 In order to show this, it is important to
delineate two types of awareness: actual and constructive. The first approach
requires positive evidence that governments actually knew that weapons were
leaving their country for Iraq. Without access to government documents this
is a difficult task, however such evidence is available on the public record.
For example, according to the German television program Panorama,'
since August 1989 the German Federal Ministry of Economic Affairs, the
Federal Office of the Economy and the Federal Intelligence Service knew
that project numbers given in business papers were code numbers for an Iraqi
missile project. The program claimed that in spite of this knowledge, the
Eschborn Office granted export licenses for some of the parts ordered from
Germany by Iraq. The program based this report on a confidential paper it
claims to have had from the Bonn Foreign Ministry dated 4 January 1990
which showed that these exports were even backed by a "Hermes" export
credit guarantee provided by the Ministry of Economic Affairs. The sales
were thus transacted with the consent of the Minister of Finance and in
agreement with the Minister of Economic cooperation.'
To give this evidence more veracity, in April 1991, German Economics
Minister Helmut Haussman said that the unwritten rule when granting export
licenses at Eschborn was: "When in doubt decide in favour of the compa-
ny."' Furthermore, Eschborn licensing officials apparently saw their role
as "helping industry rather than hindering it."'
60. French Cringe over their War Role, SUNDAY HERALD, Jan. 27, 1991, at 5.
61. He agreed in principle to supply the Dassault Mirage 2000-and have it produced in
Iraq. William Satire, Who Helped Arm Iraq? America, France and Italy, INTERNATIONAL
HERALD TRIBUNE, May 24, 1990, at 7.
62. Ledeen, German Connection, supra note 1, at 27. The U.K. government was also
aware of exports of nuclear material to Iraq. See Tom Wilkie & Alex Renton, Revealed:
British N-exports to Iraq, THE SUNDAY AGE, July 28, 1991, at 11.
63. Aired on January 29, 1991.
64. The claims were mhde in a press release by the Centre for Security Policy-Washington
No. 91-P17, Mar. 1, 1991, at 3 (on file with author). They also appear frequently in other
sources, e.g. Ledeen, German Connection, supra note 1, at 29.
65. Iraq's Silent Allies in the Quest for the Bomb, BUSINESS WEEK, Jan. 14, 1991, at 51.
66. The Wiesenthal Report, supra note 14, at 13. These claims are based on those made
in Der Spiegel, June 24, 1989, where it was alleged that Eschborn inspectors were working as
paid consultants for a German exporter (IWKA) to help it evade export legislation.
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However, despite the existence of evidence of actual knowledge, it may
be more appropriate to adopt the constructive awareness approach. To
constitute constructive knowledge, evidence of actual awareness is not
required. Instead, the inquiry is whether the governments should have been
aware of these dealings in light of their sheer extent and their vast documen-
tation in numerous public sources. This approach has led to a common
perception, that the lack of actual awareness was due principally to neglect;
a condition which afflicted the German Government in particular. According
to the influential New York Times columnist, William Safire:
What did they know and when did they know it? This question about an
official cover-up of illegal acts ... is now being asked by a belatedly
aroused free press in West Germany. Certainly for months and probably
for years, the Kohl-Genscher Government had evidence that German
'merchants of death' were illegally supplying the technological know-how
and materials for the production of poison gas in Iraq, Syria and Libya, as
well as ballistic missile technology that would hold the world cities hostage
to "the poor man's atomic bomb." But the men at the top of the world's
largest exporting nation were afflicted with "Wunschdenken"-stubbornly
wishful thinking .... Today's German leaders did not want to know who
built the plant or Iraq in Samarra .... 67
It is difficult to imagine how multi-billion dollar arsenals of sophisticated
military equipment could have passed into Iraq's hands without the awareness
of the government of the supplier state. United States Senator John McCain
when leading a group of twelve Senators and Representatives to a Defence
Conference in Munich in January 1989, made this point clearly when he
asserted that:
The time has come to be frank ... it is a matter of public record that
many West German companies and some of the most senior officials and
Ministers of the West German Government must have known since the
early 1980s that West German firms were contributing to the proliferation
of chemical weapons and biological weapons. 68
The example of the Libyan chemical weapons plant at Rabta is also
instructive in this regard. It was only after considerable pressure was exerted
on the German Government by the U.S. and others that the assistance
provided by German companies was halted.'
67. Germans too are asking: What did Germans know?, INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE,
Jan. 17, 1989, at 7.
68. See Chemical Double-Talk, SECURITY AFFAIRS, Jan. 30, 1989, at 2 (on file with author).
69. Germany bows to U.S. and restricts weapon exports, FINANCIAL REv., Jan. 12, 1989,
at 17 (on file with author). The director of the Imhausen Chemie Company that built the plant,
was subsequently jailed for five years for his involvement in the Libyan deal. See Chemical Firm
Chief jailed for Five Years in Auschwitz in the Sand Case, THE GERMAN TRIBUNE, July 15,
1990, at 6.
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Using the constructive awareness analysis, it is clear that many govern-
ments were aware of the illicit arms trade with Iraq but did little, if anything,
to halt it.
C. Damage
The damage resulting from Iraq's acquisition of non-conventional
weapons, from a factual perspective, can be briefly classified into several
categories. The first is material damage. The most apparent examples of
this are Iraq's invasion of Kuwait and the attack with Scud-B Missiles on
residential centers in Israel which caused enormous destruction to homes and
apartment blocks as well as significant civilian casualties.' Second are the
"hidden" economic costs associated with protecting against non-conventional
attacks, such as the provision of gas masks to the entire population as well
as keeping defense forces on full alert.7 Finally, there is the non-material
or "psychological" damage caused by the exposure to the risk of annihilation
by non-conventional weaponry.
It must be stressed at this point, however, that these categories are only
designed to organize the factual background. A fuller legal analysis of the
damage caused by Iraq's possession of non-conventional weaponry will be
discussed later.
To summarize the previous discussion, Iraq managed to procure a vast
non-conventional arms supply from the former USSR and Western compa-
nies, and it did so with the awareness and at times the involvement of
Western governments. Moreover, the extent of the damage suffered as a
consequence of these acquisitions was both widespread and substantial.
Bearing these facts in mind, it is now possible to undertake a legal
analysis of whether this constituted "wrongfulness" under Article 3 of the
Draft Articles. The starting point for such an analysis is therefore an
examination of the existence of both broad and narrow customary internation-
al law obligations.
II. OBLIGATIONS
In general, international obligations arise either directly from a treaty or
by derivation from customary international law.72 The broad and narrow
international obligations' which are the concern of this article are derived
from customary international law. As such, it is necessary to show the
70. According to information personally received from the Israeli Embassy in Canberra, as
yet there am no official statistics of the economic costs of the Gulf War to Israel.
71. For example, David Levy, Israel's Foreign Minister said in mid-January 1991, that
Israel's entire budget had been used up in the first six weeks of the year. See Douglas Davis,
German visit tops off Israel's traumatic week, THE AUSTRAIAN, Jan. 26, 1991, at 6.
72. Statute of the I.C.J., Article 38, 59 Stat. 1055, TS 993, 3 Bevans 1179.
73. See supra notes 7-8.
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presence of its two distinct elements-state practice and opinio juris. In other
words, for there to be an affirmative international obligation known as a
custom, states must behave in a uniform and consistent way and believe that
they are required to behave in such a manner."
In order to provide evidence of the existence of such a custom, it is
possible to use a number of different sources. Brownlie for example, cites
diplomatic correspondence, policy statements, press releases, the opinions of
official legal advisers, official manuals on legal questions, comments by
governments on drafts of the ILC, international and national judicial
decisions, recitals in treaties and other international instruments, a pattern of
treaties in the same form, U.N. resolutions and the practice of international
organs, all as evidentiary items that may be used to substantiate a custom. 75
There are various obligations that exist with respect to the transfer of
each of the non-conventional arms outlined above. Some arise directly from
treaties, while others derive from customary international law. In addition
to exploring these individual obligations, this article attempts to coalesce
them and extract both broad and narrow customary international law
obligations that require States to prevent the transfer of weapons of mass
destruction. Again, the obligation can be either erga omnes (Broad
Obligation), or only covering some States (Narrow Obligation). To that end,
it is intended to utilize several of the "sources" cited by Brownlie as
evidentiary items that can be used to substantiate a custom.
A. The Evidence
1. Treaties
Treaties can be used as evidence of international law in three separate
ways. First, they may be the direct source of an international obligation.
Second, they may be of a fundamentally "norm creating" character, so as to
be regarded as forming the basis of a general rule of customary law.76
Lastly, they may be only one piece of evidence, along with many others, that
74. North Sea Continental Shelf, 1969 I.C.J. 4 (Feb. 20).
75. IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBL1C INTERNATIONAL LAW 5 (4th ed. 1990); see also
The Paquet Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900) (Gray, J.).
76. These are also referred to as "law making" treaties. For example, the Genocide
Convention (1948), the Hague Conventions (1899) and (1907) and parts of the United Nations
Charter (e.g. Articles 2(3) and 2(4)) are of such a type. See BROWNUE, supra note 75, at 12.
The importance of this alternative lies in its effect upon states that are non-signatories to a
particular convention. For if a treaty is norm creating, then a party will be bound by it irrespec-
tive of whether it is a signatory, as the treaty merely reflects a customary international law
obligation, which is by definition universally binding. There are several factors influencing
whether a treaty is of such a character: 1) The declaratory nature of the provisions in the
treaty-the existence of a clause allowing countries to make reservations is a factor that would
detract from a treaty obligation reflecting a general custom; 2) The "quality" and "quantity"of
the number of signatory parties; and 3) Whether there is explicit acceptance of the rules of law
therein, North Sea Continental Shelf, 1969 I.C.J. 4 (Feb. 20).
13
Rubenstein: State Responsibility for Failure to Control the Export of Weapons
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 1993
332 CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL
substantiate a custom. In considering each of the following treaties, it is
necessary to bear in mind these possibilities.
a. The Biological Weapon's Convention
The Biological Weapons Convention' is the only treaty in existence
which totally outlaws an entire category of weapons.78 Under Article I,
each State party agrees to never produce, stockpile or otherwise acquire or
retain:'
1. Microbial or other biological agents or toxins whatever their origin
or method of production of types and in quantities that have no
justification for prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes; and
2. Weapons, equipment or means of delivery designed to use such
agents or toxins for hostile purposes or in armed conflict.
Article III requires each state party to the Convention not to "transfer"
directly or indirectly, or in any way "assist, encourage or induce" any state,
group or states or international organizations to manufacture or otherwise
acquire any of the agents, toxins, weapons or equipment or means of
delivery specified in Article I.
These Articles present two issues relevant to the current context. First,
we need to question the meaning of the terms "weapons, equipment or means
of delivery" mentioned in Article I. Apart from conventional bombs and
shells, of considerable pertinence here is whether a ballistic missile would be
covered by this definition. It is clear that ballistic missiles are designed to
deliver biological weapons (as well as nuclear weapons and chemical
weapons). Even though biological weapons have traditionally been uncontrol-
lable and unpredictable, the onset of recent genetic engineering programs
makes it more likely that biological weapons will be coupled to ballistic
missiles in the future." Therefore, a strong argument exists for the
inclusion of ballistic missiles within this definition. Disappointingly
however, there is no guidance given by the treaty as to the meaning to be
given to these terms.
77. Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of
Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, U.N. Resolution 2826
(XXVI-1972), 26th U.S.T. 583, T.I.A.S. No. 8062, i1 I.L.M. 309 (1972), entered into force
on March 26, 1975. There are 97 parties to the Convention.
78. Marie 1. Chevrier & Jessica E. Stem, Chemical Weapons and Biological Weapons in
the Third World, II B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 45 (1991).
79. Note that use of biological weapons is outlawed by The Geneva Protocol. Protocol for
the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases and of
Bacteriological Methods of Warfare (The Geneva Protocol), Feb. 8, 1928, 26 U.S.T. 571,
T.I.A.S. No. 8061, 94, I.N.T.S. 65.
80. See S.J. Lundin Chemical and Biological Warfare: Developments in 1988, SIPRI Y.B.
14 (1989).
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The second issue relates to the meaning of the terminology in Article III.
"Transfer," which suggests a direct transfer or sale from one state to the
other, is relatively clear. However, what does "assist, encourage or induce,"
mean? Would indifference to a state known to be developing biological
weapons be encouragement or inducement? Or would more concrete actions
be required to constitute such conduct? For example, perhaps encouragement
and inducement would mean granting material aid to a country known to be
acquiring or manufacturing biological weapons. More importantly in the
present case, where the evidence suggests state awareness of trade in such
materials, it is necessary to question whether failing to properly control this
activity, would constitute "assistance, encouragement or inducement." If this
were its meaning, then clearly in this case there is a breach by some parties
of the Article III obligations. Again, however, because the treaty is phrased
in broad terms, it provides little guidance.
Nevertheless, irrespective of the precise content of these obligations, the
outstanding question is whom they actually bind. The convention clearly
binds signatory states."1 But if it is a norm creating type treaty it will bind
non-parties as well.' To make this determination it may be helpful to
apply the factors outlined above in the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases.'
First, the Biological Weapons Convention is signed by a large percentage of
states." Second, there is general acceptance of the provisions in the treaty.
Lastly, even though there is no clause which allows a country to make
reservations, under Article XIII Para. 2 each state party has a right to with-
draw, if it decides that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of
the Convention jeopardize its interests.
Because this provision is substantially similar to a reservation clause, the
treaty cannot be viewed as universally binding. However, the Biological
Weapons Convention is an important piece of evidence along with others
demonstrating a customary international law obligation banning the
proliferation of biological weapons. Perhaps most importantly for present
purposes, it should be viewed as a component of the whole body of evidence
supporting both the narrow and broad customary international law obliga-
tions.
81. The most relevant parties here would be Germany and the former USSR.
82. This is of particular relevance in this case, as several states are not parties. France and
China both refused to sign the convention because they argued that the prohibition on biological
weapons should not have been separated from chemical weapons, while Iraq has signed, but not
yet ratified the Convention. See JOSEF GOLDBLAT, ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS: A HAND
BOOK S.I.P.R.I. 5 (1983). Where a signature is subject to ratification, signature does not
establish consent to be bound-it merely qualifies the signatory state to proceed to ratification.
See BROWNUE, supra note 75, at 606.
83. See supra note 76.
84. There are 97 signatories including all the major powers (except China and France).
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b. The Geneva Protocol
Turning to chemical weapons, the Geneva Protocol," in prohibiting the
use of both chemical weapons and biological weapons, ratified a prohibition
previously declared in other international instruments.' The major problem
with the Geneva Convention however, is that it does not ban the proliferation
of chemical weapons as well.' In that regard, the Chemical Weapons
Convention, which was opened for signing in Paris on January 13, 1993, will
attempt to effect a universal, verifiable ban on the development, acquisition,
and transfer of chemical weapons.""
c. Chemical Weapons Convention
The Chemicals Weapons Convention was negotiated and drafted by the
Conference on Disarmament" during the period from 1971 to 1993. The
Conference on Disarmament reported its progress on negotiations at regular
intervals in a "rolling text" which contained the provisions which were
progressively agreed upon by negotiators.' In August 1992 a complete
revised text of the Chemical Weapons Convention was accepted by the
Conference on Disarmament and was approved soon thereafter by the UN
General Assembly. Since opening for signature on January 13, 1993, 141
States have signed the Convention. The Convention will enter into force on
the later of the 13th of January 1995 or 180 days after the 65th State has
ratified the convention. To date only two States have ratified the conven-
tion.9" Among other things, the provisions of the Convention address the
prohibitions on the transfer of chemical weapons and the adoption of national
measures by states for their implementation.
It is clear that since 1987-88, the scope of obligations that were agreed
upon included obligations not to "transfer" chemical weapons to anyone as
85. Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other
Gases and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare (The Geneva Protocol), 26 U.S.T. 571,
T.I.A.S. No. 8061, 94, I.N.T.S. 65, done at Geneva on Feb. 8, 1928.
86. These included the 1899 Hague Declaration IV, 2, under which contracting powers
agreed to abstain from the use of projectiles for the diffusion of asphyxiating gases, as well as
the 1907 Hague Convention IV which had a similar effect. There is an increasing tendency to
see this prohibition as representing customary international law and this is reflected in the
practice of states. See Timothy L.H. McCormack, International Law and the Use of Chemical
Weapons in the Gulf War, 21 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 3 (1990).
87. With respect to biological weapons, this is achieved by the Biological Weapons Conven-
tion.
88. See J.G. Starke, The Final Declaration of the Paris Conference on Chemical Weapons,
11th January 1989, 63 AUST. L.J. 434 (1989).
89. See The Origins, Aims and Structure of the Conference on Disarmament, DEPARTMENT
OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND TRADE BACKGROUNDER, May 17, 1991, at 12.
90. Forty nations were represented in the negotiations. See S.J. Lundin, Multilateral and
Bilateral Talks on Chemical and Biological Weapons, SIPRI Y.B. 521 (1990).
91. As of April 8, 1993.
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well as not to "assist, encourage or induce" others to engage in these activi-
ties.' These would appear to carry a similar conceptual and practical
meaning to those enunciated in the Biological Weapons Convention, although
here there is somewhat more guidance.
For example, in response to a question from the former USSR as to how
a different but related obligation to destroy chemical weapons "under the
jurisdiction and control of a state party" would relate to transnational
corporations which had manufacturing operations in another country which
was not a party to the Chemical Weapons Convention, the U.S. replied that
any corporation incorporated under U.S. law wherever its activities took
place, would be prohibited from aiding a non-party in chemical weapon
production.' Thus presumably, just as a state would be required to control
corporations when carrying out an obligation to destroy chemical weapons,
it would also be required to exercise such control with respect to an
obligation not to "transfer" chemical weapons or "assist, encourage or
induce" other states to engage in chemical weapons activities.
However, the question still remains as to whether it can be said that such
an obligation with respect to chemical weapons presently exists and whether
it existed at the time that certain Western companies were aiding Iraq; a time
which preceded the finalization of the Chemical Weapons Convention.
Because the Convention has not entered into force, it cannot yet directly bind
potential signatories, or be norm-creating. However, its value lies in its
ability to support a custom with respect to chemical weapons. Such an
argument depends upon the value of an unfinished convention as a compo-
nent of customary international law. Some argue that a convention has no
status until it is formally agreed upon and ratified.' However, as treaties
may be invoked as evidence of customary international law, there is force
behind the argument that negotiated drafts of a convention, or preparatory
work may also be used in that fashion. Indeed, Judge Lachs in The North
Sea Continental Shelf Cases said that "It is generally realized that provisions
of international instruments may acquire the status of general rules of
international law. Even unratified treaties may constitute a point of departure
for a legal practice. " "
Therefore, if in the "rolling text," there had been agreement for some
time upon these obligations with respect to chemical weapons, it is cogent to
argue for the Chemical Weapons Convention to be used along with other
92. See Josef Goldblat, Multilateral Arms Control Efforts, SIPRI Y.B. 348 (1988) and see
the "rolling text."
93. Conference on Disarmament document, CD. PV. 424 (on file with author).
94. For example, once the Chemical Weapons Convention is accepted by the U.N. General
Assembly and then ratified by signatory States. Heinz Gartner, Multilateral Arms Control
Efforts, SIPRI Y.B. 427 (1989).
95. North Sea Continental Shelf, 1969 I.C.J. at 255 (Feb. 20).
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instruments' as evidence of an existing custom with respect to both
chemical weapons and all weapons of mass destruction.
For example, on January 11, 1989, over 140 countries attended a
conference on chemical weapons in Paris which was designed to support the
Geneva negotiations at the Conference on Disarmament on a Chemical
Weapons Convention.' Although it did not succeed in implementing
negotiations of the Chemical Weapons Convention, an important final
declaration was adopted outlawing chemical weapons." It recognized the
importance of the Geneva Protocol, the UN's role in disarmament and the
necessity of concluding, at an early date, a Chemical Weapons Convention
which would be: (a) global; (b) comprehensive; (c) effectively verifiable; and
(d) of unlimited duration.'
While not a treaty, this declaration"® was intimately linked with the
negotiations on the Chemical Weapons Convention. Its legal significance lies
in its ability to help form a custom with respect to chemical weapons, and all
weapons of mass destruction. The cogency of using the Paris Declaration in
this fashion is underlined by the fact that in the Gulf War Ceasefire
Resolution, Iraq while being warned of its obligations, was reminded that:
1. It was a party to the Geneva Protocol;
2. It had signed the Biological Weapons Convention; and
3. That it had subscribed to" the Declaration of the Paris Conference.
In addition, in 1989, there was yet another Conference held to facilitate the
conclusion of the Chemical Weapons Convention by the Conference on
Disarmament. Delegates from 56 countries, the UN, the EEC and the World
Chemical Industry attended. In similar fashion to the Paris Conference, a
96. This custom is evidenced by many other agreements and instruments which will be
examined below.
97. See Carlo Costka, Arms Control: Declaration of the Paris Chemical Weapons
Conference, 30 HARV. INT'L L.J. 495 (1989).
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. The legal status of such a declaration is unsettled. Schachter considers that as such
instruments are official acts of states, they are evidence of the positions taken by states and: "It
is appropriate to draw inferences that the states concerned have recognized the principles, rules,
status and rights acknowledged. This does not mean that 'new law' or a new obligation is
created. However, where the points of law are not entirely clear and undisputed, the evidence
of official positions drawn from these instruments can be significant." Oscar Schachter, Interna-
tional Law in Theory and Practice, 178 REC. DES. COURS 21, 129 (1982). Henkin also argues
that such a non legal text may over time become customary law on the basis of state practice and
opinio-juris and that consequence does not depend on the original intent of the parties to the
instrument, Louis HENKIN, Er AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW 136 (2d ed. 1987). O'Connell on the
other hand, sees such a political declaration as not carrying legal weight especially when it is
based on broad principles and/or is indefinite, D.P. O'CONNELI, INTERNATIONAL LAW 199-200
(2d ed. 1970).
101. Emphasis added.
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declaration was adopted which supported the early completion of a Chemical
Weapons Convention."
In addition to the declaration, a number of national initiatives were
made. For example, Australian Foreign Minister Gareth Evans announced
the intention of Australia to create the nucleus of a national authority for the
implementation of a Chemical Weapons Convention.I3 Other countries also
announced similar moves.
Despite the foregoing, even if the obligation with respect to chemical
weapons does not yet exist, it is still a relevant issue for the following three
reasons. First, because chemical weapon proliferation is becoming an
increasingly important international issue, it is possible that the obligation is
merely emerging as customary international law. 1°1 Second, and perhaps
more importantly, because it is becoming increasingly obvious that a
Chemical Weapons Convention will enter into force in the near future, °5
the treaty will crystallize the obligation, at least with respect to party states,
so that firm steps will have to be taken to prevent chemical weapon prolifera-
tion. Third, under the terms of the Gulf War Ceasefire Resolution"°  it
seems clear that at least with respect to Iraq, all states are now obliged to
prevent the flow of chemical weapons to that country, as well as all weapons
of mass destruction.
d. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
Turning to nuclear weapons, the cornerstone of international nuclear
non-proliferation is the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty,"°7 now adhered
to by 140 nations, encompassing both "nuclear weapon states" and "non-
nuclear weapon" states.' s
102. J.G. Starke, The Government Industry Conference v. Chemical Weapons, Canberra 18-
22 September 1989, 63 AUST. L.J. 786 (1989).
103. Id.
104. That is, it has not yet crystallized.
105. See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
106. U.N. Security Council Resolution 687 (Apr. 2, 1991), G.A. Res. 687, U.N. Doc.
S/23165 (1991).
107. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, entered into force, Mar. 5, 1970,
21 U.S.T. 483.
108. There are three "nuclear weapon States"-the U.S., former USSR and U.K. The only
two declared nuclear weapon states not party to the convention are France and China, yet they
both sent observers to the NPT's 4th Review Conference (see John Lehman, Director of the
U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Non-Proliferation Policy of the U.S., U.S.I.S.
(U.S. Information Service) BACKGROUNDER, Apr. 15, 1991, at 5) and have announced their
willingness to sign the NPT. The French plan was outlined in "Plan Francais De Maitrise Des
Armements et de Disarmament" (The French Disarmament Plan), by President Mitterand, where
it was stated that: "France has decided in principle to sign [the NPT] and hopes that all states
will adhere to it." The document was obtained personally from the French Embassy in Canberra.
The Chinese Premier, Li Peng announced similar Chinese intentions to the Japanese Prime
Minister Toshiki Kaifu in Beijing, China will sign Treaty, THE SUNDAY AGE, Aug. 11, 1991,
at 11. Under Article IX, a nuclear weapon state is one that had manufactured and exploded a
19
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Under Article I, nuclear weapon states agree not to "transfer" nuclear
weapons, nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons directly or
indirectly or in any way to "assist, encourage or induce" any non-nuclear
weapon state to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other
devices. It seems clear by implication, that this undertaking also applies to
non-nuclear weapon states."
Article II on the other hand, enunciates the converse proposition. That
is, non-nuclear weapon states undertake not to "receive" the transfer of any
nuclear weapons or to "manufacture or acquire" or "seek to receive any
assistance" in manufacturing nuclear weapons or other devices.
However, under Article III (1) parties can provide fissionable material
or equipment especially designed for peaceful nuclear purposes to non-
nuclear weapon parties, provided this material is subject to the safeguard of
the IAEA. 110 It is clear, therefore, that Article III requires nuclear export-
er states to request such safeguards on all relevant exports and to create the
necessary legal and administrative conditions to live up to this obligation.
Failure to do so would constitute breach of a treaty obligation."' In the
present context, having regard to the enormous quantity of nuclear material
acquired by Iraq from many Western (especially German) companies, it
could be argued that Germany's (and others) failure to properly create these
necessary conditions breached their Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
obligations.
It is clear, therefore, that like other treaties outlined above, the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty provides clear obligations with respect to the
weapons it seeks to control. Yet whom do they bind? The parties to the
Convention are clearly bound." 2 Moreover, if the Nuclear Non-Prolifera-
tion Treaty is seen as norm creating then non-parties will also be bound by
its obligations. But it seems unlikely that, on its own, this treaty is of such
a character. The reason is similar to that of the Biological Weapons Conven-
tion, in that each party has a right to withdraw (with at least 3 months notice)
nuclear weapon or other device prior to January 1, 1967.
109. Harold Muiller, Prospects for the 4th Review of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, SIPRI
Y.B. 2556 (1990).
110. The IAEA is the International organization that negotiates, safeguards and inspects
nuclear facilities to assure there has been no diversion of nuclear material for nuclear weapons.
111. For example, in the past five years, German companies have exported without
safeguard to India, Pakistan and South Africa. This led a German parliamentary investigation
to reveal serious weaknesses in their export control system. It found that the responsible
agencies were understaffed and underfunded, and the Ministries charged with their supervision
held a policy of export first, control second. The law left wide gaps with ridiculously low
penalties in comparison to the profits to be gained from illegally trading. Moreover, serious
investigations were rarely launched lest companies suffer undue competitive advantages. This
led at least one commentator to suggest that; "while Germany kept to the letter of the NPT,
implementation was less than sufficient and the spirit of the NFT was violated." Further, he
claimed that: "The negligence of some exporters, notably Germany, raises serious doubts about
the Article III (2) obligations having been properly met." See Maller, supra note 109, at 565.
112. Iraq therefore, as a party, is clearly in violation of Article II especially in view of its
admission of clandestine attempts to build nuclear weapons.
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if it decides that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of the
treaty jeopardize its interests."' Consequently, it is more likely that the
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty is merely one piece of evidence together
with others" 4 toward a custom prohibiting nuclear weapon proliferation.
Perhaps most importantly, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty should be
seen as forming part of the evidence supporting the more general customary
international law obligations with respect to all weapons of mass destruction.
e. Other Treaties
There are two other relevant treaties, but as neither ever entered into
force, they are solely supportive of the general customary international law.
The first is the Convention of St. Germaine (1919) introduced by the League
of Nations, which formed the basis of all subsequent arms control treaties.
It attempted to prohibit all arms exports, except those permitted by means of
export licenses granted by Governments. The second is the Geneva
Convention on the Arms Trade (1925), whose purpose was to prevent illicit
arms traffic rather than reduce the international arms trade. This was to be
accomplished by "supervision" in the form of uniform export licensing by
governments and publicity in the form of statistical returns of foreign trade
in arms." 5
2. Agreements
This category discusses the importance and effect of several international
agreements that are supposedly "non-binding." In other words, unlike the
treaties examined above, the following agreements apparently do not directly
create binding international obligations upon party states. Rather, they
appear to possess more of a political character. However, like treaties, these
agreements are also legally important in three respects:
1. They may in fact be regarded as treaties, depending upon either the
express or implied intention of the parties;1 6
113. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, supra note 107, at art. X.
114. For example, the Nuclear Supplier Guidelines, the Nuclear Exporters Committee, U.N.
Resolutions and Domestic Laws.
115. GOLDBLAT, supra note 82, at 5.
116. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 2, U.N. Docs. A/Conf.
39/27 (1969), defines treaty to mean "an international agreement concluded between states in
written form and governed by international law. . ... " The agreements in question here, are
concluded between states and are in written form, but whether or not they are "governed by
international law" depends upon the express or implied intention of the parties, which if existent
will mean the document is a treaty and thus subject to the rules of international law. See Jimenez
de Arechaga, International Law in the Past Third of the Century 159 REC. DES. COURS 35-37
(1978). Such an intention can be gleaned from such factors as: (a) the nature of the language-if
broad and indefinite-this is less likely to show an intention; (b) whether the agreement is treated
as an agreement of legal character in submissions to national parliaments or courts; and (c) the
level of authority of the governmental representatives who have signed the agreement. See Oscar
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2. Like declarations and treaties, they may support the existence of a
custom; and
3. While not engaging the legal responsibility'17 of the parties, there are
both political and moral expectations, so that as long as it lasts, it can be an
authoritative and controlling document for the parties.
However, with respect to the following agreements, only the second and
third variants are relevant because there is little room to argue that the
intention (either express or implied) of the parties is sufficiently strong to
support their characterization as treaties. Bearing in mind these consider-
ations, it is now necessary to turn to the substance of the agreements.
a. The Australia Group
In 1984, in response to reports of the use of chemical weapons in the
Iran/Iraq War, a group of Western nations formed the "Australia
Group,". under which all members agreed to place a list of dangerous
precursor chemicals" 9 under strict export control. There were 50 chemi-
cals in all. Eleven of these were on a "core list," requiring restrictive
review before being licensed, the other 39 were on a "warning list."" 2
Recently however, multilateral consensus was reached between the members
on the need to place all 50 chemicals under the same restrictive export con-
trols.' It is important to point out that it is not only Western nations that
have been adopting such controls. In 1987, the Eastern Bloc States discussed
similar measures in Leipzig."z
Clearly then, it can be seen that many states are applying export controls
either erga-omnes or only in respect of recipient states likely to use these
chemicals for chemical weapons-such as Iran, Iraq and Syria."23 More-
over, given its expanding membership and degree of implementation, the
"Australia Group" reflects and supports the existence of a customary
international law obligation to prevent the flow of chemical weapons and all
weapons of mass destruction.
Schachter, The Twilight Existence of Non-Binding International Agreements, 71 AMERICAN J.
INT'L L. 296 (1977).
117. Therefore, non-compliance by a party would not be a ground for reparation or judicial
remedies (c.f. a treaty) Id.
118. There are now 20 members: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, West
Germany, France, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway,
Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the U.K. and the former USSR (cf. the original seven).
See Lehman, supra note 108, at 7.
119. See supra note 32.
120. Lehman, supra note 108, at 7.
121. See Stuart Auerbach, 19 Industrial Countries Agree to War Chemicals Control, THE
AGE, June 1, 1991, at 15.
122. Id.
123. See S.J. Lundin, et al., Chemical and Biological Warfare: Developments in 1987,
SIPRI Y.B.1988: WORLD ARMAMENTS AND DISARMAMENT 101, 104 (1988).
[Vol. 23
22
California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 23, No. 2 [1993], Art. 3
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol23/iss2/3
1993] STATE'S FAILURE TO CONTROL THE EXPORT OF WEAPONS 341
b. The Nuclear Exporters Committee and the Nuclear Supplier Guidelines
These are two groups that are associated with the Nuclear Non-Prolifera-
tion Treaty. The former is involved in the delineation of those nuclear
exports that will trigger the need for IAEA safeguards. " The Nuclear
Supplier Guidelines on the other hand, brought nuclear suppliers who were
not party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (principally France), into
a similar control regime. Notably however, a recent meeting of the Nuclear
Supplier Guidelines agreed that there was a need to extend the existing
guidelines to control exports of so-called "dual use" items which are equip-
ment not specifically designed for nuclear purposes but which can be so
used. "
As a result, it can be seen that as with chemical weapons, there is also
a supply regime "informally" adhered to by a number of different states. It
could also be argued that this contributes to the notion of a fairly uniform
and widespread practice of non-proliferation of both nuclear weapons and all
weapons of mass destruction.
c. The Missile Technology Control Regime
The close relationship between ballistic missiles and other weapons of
mass destruction has created a new arms race among regional powers, so that
the problem of ballistic missile proliferation has now reached global
proportions. Yet at present there is no binding international treaty concerned
with this issue. Rather, the central focus of international efforts in that
regard is the missile technology control regime," which like the Australia
Group is a "non-binding" agreement. Thus, it is both a declaration of intent
by its adherents to apply a common set of export controls over missiles and
missile technology,127 and a means to convince non-member suppliers to
avoid technology exports which undercut the regime's non-proliferation
controls.
In addition, the missile technology control regime presents detailed
guidelines with respect to two broad categories of equipment, which member
states by their practice have implemented quite rigorously."2 Yet despite
124. Committee members made up of 23 nations meet twice a year to review and update the
list as technology warrants. The committee is otherwise known as the Zangger Committee. See
Lehman, supra note 108, at 6.
125. For example sophisticated metals could be used to make either machinery for peaceful
purposes or to make uranium centrifuges. Id. at 7.
126. Membership consists of 15 countries. Id. at 8.
127. See Martha Fitzpatrick, Arms Control: Export Controls on Missile Technology, 29
HARV. INT'L L.J. 142 (1988).
128. For example, in the U.S., customs agents and courts have taken a leading role in cases
of MTCR violation-U.S. citizens have been imprisoned for conspiring to sell to Egypt and
South Africa. In Italy, charges were brought against a firm named SNIA-BDP for ballistic
missile sales to the Egyptian-Argentinean Condor 2 missile program. In Germany there were
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this, it would be difficult to argue that there is an intention for this to be
regarded as a treaty, for legal sanction to attach to members for non-
compliance with the regime. Therefore, the Missile Technology Control
Regime is of primary importance for its contribution to a general customary
international law obligation with respect to all weapons of mass destruction.
3. Security Council Resolutions
Under Article 24 of the U.N. Charter, the Security Council is given
primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and
security. Accordingly, under Article 25, all members agree to accept and
carry out the decisions of the Security Council, which means that Security
Council Resolutions are absolutely binding on all member states. In this
context, there are two relevant sets of resolutions:" 9 the Iran-Iraq war
resolutions and the Gulf War cease fire resolution."3
The former are two separate but substantially similar resolutions which
were passed in the context of investigating the use of chemical weapons in
the Iran-Iraq War. They call upon all states to:
establish or to strengthen strict control of the export of chemical products
serving for the production of chemical weapons, in particular to parties to
a conflict, when it is established or there is substantial reason to believe
that they have used chemical weapons in violation of international obliga-
tions.
They thereby lay the basis for concluding that there is an international
obligation incumbent on all states to prevent the export of chemical weapons,
especially when it is foreseeable that they will be used.
The latter resolution, though it was promulgated after the Gulf War, is
relevant because it states that as of the 2nd of April 1991, there was an
absolute obligation on states to prevent the export of any weapons of mass
destruction to Iraq."' Although the resolution does not bear any relevance
to the events of arms supply to Iraq prior to the Gulf War, it is yet another
judicial investigations into the MBB and Glob. Sat. companies for ballistic missile sales to
Libya. See Aaron Karp, Ballistic Missile Proliferation, SIPRI Y.B. 1990: WORLD ARMAMENTS
AND DISARMAMENTS 369 (1990).
129. S.C. Res. 612, U.N. SCOR, 43d Sess., 2812th mtg. at 10, U.N. Doc. S/INF/44
(1988), and S.C. Res. 620, U.N. SCOR, 43d Sess., 2825 mtg. at 12, U.N.Doc. S/INF/44
(1988).
130. See supra note 106.
131. The relevant parts of the resolution in this regard, are paragraphs 24 and 25. Paragraph
24 states "all states are to prevent the sale or supply or promotion or facilitation of such sale or
supply to Iraq by their nationals or from their territories or using their flag, vessels or aircraft
of: (a) arms and related material of all types; (b) biological weapons, chemical weapons, nuclear
weapons and ballistic missiles; (c) technology; (d) personnel." Paragraph 25 calls upon all states
to act strictly in accordance with paragraph 24 notwithstanding the existence of any contracts,
agreements, etc.
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piece of evidence contributing to the existence of a custom with respect to all
weapons of mass destruction.
4. Domestic Legislation
Domestic or municipal law, while relevant to international law under
Article 38 (1)(c) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, 132 its
main purpose in this context is to serve as an additional item of evidence to
substantiate the general customary international law obligations.13
Bearing this in mind, it is important to realize that the content of
legislative and administrative steps taken by many states"M to implement
the treaties and agreements outlined above, are substantially similar.
In the U.S., there has long been strict control over the export of all
weapons and in particular weapons of mass destruction. For example, the
relevant export authorities have always possessed a list of suspicious buyers
and of "significant military equipment"' 35 over which to exercise particular
caution. Consequently, arms exports are totally prohibited'3 to certain
states, including those upon which there is an embargo (South Africa,
Angola, Chile) and those which have supported terrorism.' 37 Moreover, the
Department of State has discretion to suspend any export license at any
time. 138
Of greater significance are two recently implemented measures designed
to combat non-conventional weapons proliferation. The first is the Exports
Amendment Act, 139 under which, the U.S. is required to pursue the controls
outlined in the Missile Technology Control Regime, Australia Group, the
Nuclear Supplier Guidelines and the proposed Chemical Weapons Conven-
132. Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38(1)(c), as annexed to the Charter of
the United Nations, 59 Stat. 1055, T.S. No. 993, 3 Bevans 1153, 1 U.N.T.S. (signed at San
Francisco, June 26, 1945, entered into force October 24, 1945). Article 38(l)(c): "the Court
whose function it is to decide in accordance with international law such disputes as are submitted
to it, shall apply: (c) the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations."
133. It is in this vein that Brownlie argues that "acts of legislation provide prima facie
evidence of the attitudes of states on points of international law and very often constitute the only
available evidence of the practice of states," so that they are thus "important in any assessment
of customary law," See BROWNLIE, supra note 75, at 55.
134. The U.S., former USSR, France, Germany and the U.K. supply approximately 80%
of annual arms exports. Thus, the states detailed here are representative of these suppliers in
addition to several others. See Agnes Courades Allebeck, Arms Trade Regulations, SIPRI Y.B.
119 (1989).
135. See International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR), 22 C.F.R. § 123.10 (1973).
These are the implementing regulations of the Internal Security Assistance and Arms Export
Control Act (1976) (AECA).
136. International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR), 22 C.F.R. §§ 121.01-130.33 (1982).
137. Iran, Syria, North Korea, Cuba, Libya and South Yemen. lraq appeared on the latter
list in the early 1980s but was removed from the list to enable U.S. support in the Iran-Iraq
War. See supra note 13.
138. International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR), 22 C.F.R. §§ 121.03-130.33 (1982).
139. The Omnibus Export Amendments Act (1990), H.R. 4653, 101st Congress, 2d Sess.,
CONG. REC. S. 17,984-01 which is designed to re-authorize the Export Administration Act.
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tion. More importantly, the Bill imposes mandatory sanctions on U.S. and
foreign persons exporting such controlled goods or technologies without
authorization, and also on foreign countries developing or using controlled
items in violation of international law. 140
However, although the U.S. is committed to these proliferation controls,
former President Bush consistently vetoed the Bill objecting to limitations on
the President's discretionary power.141 Therefore, rather than approve the
Bill, former President Bush issued the Export Product Control Initiative
(EPCI), on December 13, 1990,142 which set forth specific measures for
preventing the spread of weapons of mass destruction. It provides that:
1. The U.S. shall adopt worldwide export controls on all 50 chemical
weapon precursors and shall urge all nations to adopt similar controls.
2. Licenses must be obtained for proposed exports of any potentially
related chemical weapons industrial facilities, related designs or technology.
3. Licenses must be obtained for any export destined for a publicly
listed company, government, agency or other entity engaged in activities of
proliferation concern.
4. Licenses shall be required when an exporter knows 143 or is in-
formed by the U.S. Government, that a proposed export may be destined for
a project of proliferation concern. (A similar regulation already applies to
exports of possible nuclear weapons material.)
5. Current regulations shall be supplemented by control lists of: (i) dual
use equipment and technology related to weapons of mass destruction; and
(ii) countries to which such equipment and technology shall be controlled.
6. Civil and criminal penalties shall be imposed upon U.S. citizens who
knowingly participate in activities that promote the spread of ballistic missile
technology and chemical weapons (similar penalties already apply in the
areas of nuclear weapons and biological weapons.).
French export regulations are similar in content to those of the United
States. Under French law, there can be no export of any arms without a
license, and in some cases this will not be granted without special authoriza-
tion from the Prime Minister. 1" More importantly, France has recently
implemented both the Australia Group and missile technology control regime
regulations in an attempt to prevent such proliferation.
In Germany, there can be no authorization of export of any weapons if:
(a) there is a risk that they will be used in an action disturbing the peace, in
140. Id.
141. George N. Grammas, Multilateral Responses to the Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait: Economic
Sanctions and Emerging Proliferation Controls, 15 MD. J. INT'L L. & TRADE 1 (1991).
142. These were issued by executive order 12,735 under the authority of The Internal
Emergency Economic Powers Act, 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 1701-1706 (1982 & Supp. V. 1987).
143. An exporter will be deemed to "know" when that person "is aware that the good or
technology will be used in the design, development, production or use of a weapons of mass
destruction or that such result is substantially certain to occur." Imposition and Expansion of
Foreign Policy Controls, 56 Fed. Reg. 10,765 (1991).
144. Allebeck, supra note 134, at 325.
[Vol. 23
26
California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 23, No. 2 [1993], Art. 3
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol23/iss2/3
1993] STATE'S FAILURE TO CONTROL THE EXPORT OF WEAPONS 345
particular an offensive war; or (b) there is reason to believe that transfer
could damage Germany's commitments under international law or threaten
their fulfillment." However, according to more recent guidelines export
licenses can be granted if motivated by "vital foreign policy and security
interests of the FRG," but only if: (a) the internal situation of the importing
country is positive; and (b) the weapons to be delivered will not exacerbate
regional tensions."
More importantly, like the U.S., Germany has recently taken specific
legislative and administrative measures to curb the flow of weapons of mass
destruction. 47 These measures include:
(1) Banning the export of all 50 chemical precursors (from the Australia
Group) without a license;
(2) Tightening controls on all technology transfers;
(3) Requiring export licenses for anything that could be suited for
production of biological weapons;
(4) Banning all trade with Libya over chemicals; and
(5) Increasing punishments for violations of the legislation. 48
The Italian Government has also recently introduced measures to forbid any
"manufacture, import, export, and transit of biological weapon, chemical
weapon and nuclear weapons; pre-arranged research for their production; or
transfer of related technologies. "1 49 In addition, Italy is an original signato-
ry of the missile technology control regime, and adheres to the guidelines of
the Australia Group.
Subject to international agreements made by the Swedish Government
and resolutions of the U.N. Security Council, Sweden restricts the export of
all weapons unless the recipient state is not: (a) engaged in armed conflict
with other states; (b) involved in international conflicts that may lead to
armed conflicts; (c) a state in which internal armed disturbances are taking
place; or (d) a state that can be expected to use Swedish weapons to suppress
human rights." ° In addition, Sweden regulates exports in accordance with
both the Australia Group and missile technology control regime.
The U.K. requires an export license for virtually every export. In
addition, it is an original signatory of both the Australia Group and missile
technology control regime.
145. Gesetz Uber die Krontrolle von Kriegswaffen (KWKG), 1961 § 6 (3) (F.R.G.) (on file
with author).
146. Allebeck, supra note 134, at 329.
147. But only after considerable pressure was exerted on the German Government by the
U.S. and others.
148. These laws are all outlined in a document received personally from the German
Embassy in Canberra dated "Bonn 15/10/90." (on file with author).
149. Law No. 1985, Article 1.7, July 19, 1990. This information was received personally
from Italian Embassy in Canberra. (on file with author).
150. Allebeck, supra note 134, at 332.
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Extensive information on Japanese export regulations is unavailable.
However, Japan is an original signatory to both the Australia Group and
missile technology control regime.,"
Legal documents and legislation regulating the Soviet arms trade were,
in the past, not available on request. 152 However, Pravda reported that in
February 1986, the former USSR promulgated the "regulations on exports
from the USSR of chemicals of dual use," in an attempt to control the flow
of chemical weapons.'
5. Policy Statements, Press Releases
Policy statements and press releases can provide evidence of the
existence of customary international law. While substantiation of a custom
would require reference to statements and releases prior to the time at which
it is asserted to be in existence, to do so here would be too detailed a task.
As such, reference will be made to statements made after that time. But
these too are of considerable importance because they reflect a widespread
appreciation of the need to prevent proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction, especially since the Gulf War. It is such an appreciation that
lends support to the existence of the general customary obligations.
There have been numerous French policy statements addressing this
issue. On September 29, 1988, President Mitterand addressed the 43rd
Session of the United Nations General Assembly on the then forthcoming
Paris Conference. In that speech, he indicated the importance of enacting
multilateral export regulations." Subsequently, France has hosted the
Conference and announced its "grand disarmament"' 55 plan declaring its
readiness to sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
Prior to the Gulf War, there had been innumerable pronouncements by
successive U.S. Administrations, congressmen and other officials advocating
the need to stem the flow of non-conventional weaponry. 56 The culmina-
tion of these statements was an announcement by former President Bush in
May 1991,11' in which he declared the commitment of the U.S. to stopping
the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. To give meaning to this
commitment, Bush advanced two proposals. The first was a plan to totally
ban chemical weapons throughout the world, and the second was an initiative
151. See "Diplomatic Book 1990-Japan's diplomatic activities." Available from the
Japanese Embassy, Canberra. (on file with author).
152. Allebeck, supra note 134, at 324.
153. Id.
154. S.J. Lundin, Chemical and Biological Warfare; Developments in 1988, SIPRI Y.B.
1989: WORLD ARMAMENTS AND DISARMAMENT 107-08 (1989).
155. See supra note 97.
156. For examples see the Factual Context above.
157. Bush proposes arms control initiative for the Middle East, United States Information
Service Backgrounder, May 30, 1991, at 6 (on file with author).
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to control proliferation of all weapons of mass destruction, which would be
applied initially to the Middle East. 5 '
The name of the Australia Group bears testimony to the importance
placed on non-proliferation (especially of chemical weapons) by the
Australian Government. This concern is highlighted by repeated calls by
Foreign Minister Gareth Evans for the conclusion of the Chemical Weapons
Convention. At a May 1991 disarmament conference in Kyoto, Japan
Former Minister Evans requested a meeting of Foreign Ministers in Geneva
to conclude the convention. 159 He argued at the conference that the time
was right to remove obstacles that have so far blocked agreements on the
Chemical Weapons Convention.
B. General Custom?
Having reviewed the evidence and summarized the individual obliga-
tions, it is now necessary to return to the underlying theme and consider
whether it can be said that there are either broad or narrow general
customary international law obligations to control the export of weapons of
mass destruction. More importantly, it must be determined whether they
existed at the time of the alleged breaches. In order to answer these
questions, a more thorough examination of the two elements of custom-state
practice and opinio-juris-is required.
1. State Practice
The existence of a particular state practice depends upon several factors:
(1) The passage of time over which the rule is followed;
(2) The uniformity of the state practice; and
(3) The extensiveness of the state practice-i.e. the number and type of
states which adhere to the practice. 160
Are these factors present in the case under consideration? The evidence
suggests that there have been widespread efforts to prevent the flow of
assorted non-conventional weapons for many years, beginning as far back as
the turn of the century when several attempts were made to create treaties
regulating arms sales. However, significant momentum towards a consistent
state practice was not achieved until approximately two decades ago, when
the Biological Weapons Convention (1972) and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty (1970) were completed. Since then, non-proliferation controls on all
weapons of mass destruction have blossomed. This is especially true in the
last five to six years, primarily as a result of both the Iran-Iraq War and the
158. Id.
159. Tom Ormonde, Evans wins new backing for chemical weapons ban, THE AGE, May
28, 1991, at 7.
160. North Sea Continental Shelf, 1969 I.C.J. 4 (Feb. 20).
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subsequent Gulf War. Hence, the Australia Group, Missile Technology
Control Regime, domestic legislative regimes and Chemical Weapons
Convention negotiations have all become predominant in this period.
Yet, is it sufficient to show a significant state practice only over a period
of five to six years? According to the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases:
the passage of only a short period of time is not necessarily, or of itself,
a bar to the formation of a new rule of customary international law on the
basis of what was originally a purely conventional rule, [although] an
indispensable requirement would be that ... the practice... should have
been both extensive and virtually uniform. 61
Furthermore, Brownlie states that "provided the consistency and generality
of a practice are proved, no particular duration is required . "162
Therefore, the lack of an extensive period of time will not prevent the
finding of a state practice if there is both uniformity and extensiveness of the
state practice.
The requirement of uniformity only necessitates a demonstration of
substantial uniformity of practice rather than complete uniformity in
practice.1" The evidence suggests there is substantial uniformity in the
way in which states are preventing the export of weapons of mass destruc-
tion. The Biological Weapons Convention (96 parties), Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty (140 parties) and the Chemical Weapons Convention (40
negotiators and 26 observers) all contain an obligation not to "transfer" to
any recipient or in any way "assist, encourage or induce" states to produce
either biological weapons, nuclear weapons or chemical weapons. 16 The
language and content of such obligations is uniform. Furthermore, it has
been demonstrated that there is an increasingly consistent pattern of imple-
mentation of these responsibilities with various states having enacted laws
and regulations in line with these treaties and non-binding agreements.
The requirement of extensiveness on the other hand, is problematic. For
although a substantial number of states have signed the relevant treaties and
non-binding agreements, the ultimate test of the existence of an obligation
lies in the actual "quantity" and "quality" of parties who are conforming to
the practice. There must be a representative participation in the practice of
those states particularly affected. To adopt the example of the Law of the
Sea Convention, if it were signed by one hundred land locked states, the
importance of the extensiveness of the practice would be minimal. However,
161. Id.
162. BROWNUE, supra note 75, at 5.
163. Fisheries Case, 1951 I.C.J. 116, at 131 (Dec. 18).
164. See Article III, Biological Warfare Convention, supra note 77, Article I NPT, "rolling
text" Chemical Weapons Convention.
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if it were signed by only ten states, including the world's five greatest
shipping states, this would be significant."
Applying that reasoning in this context, it is, therefore, very significant
that those states that supply approximately 80% of all arms exports are all
uniformly applying controls to non-conventional weapons. Therefore, given
the time over which the practice has been implemented, its uniformity, and
its extensiveness among those states of greatest significance, it is submitted
that the evidence supports the existence of a "state practice."
2. Opinio Juris
In addition to state practice, there must also be a belief on the part of
states that the practice is rendered obligatory by a rule of law. The essential
problem with respect to this element is one of proof and who is to carry the
burden of proof. There are two methods of addressing this problem. The
first has been adopted in a significant minority of cases," and it is the
more exacting. It requires positive evidence of the recognition by a state of
the validity of the rules in question. If this approach is adopted it must be
positively shown that a state is acting a certain way because it believes it is
bound not to export weapons of mass destruction. Thus, the outcome will
depend upon the evidence in each case. Unfortunately, however, this notion
of opinio juris raises a theoretical flaw which threatens to undermine the
whole basis of legally proving the existence of any obligation. That is, a
state would no doubt argue that its acquiescence in a uniform and widespread
practice, (for example non-proliferation) was not due to any perceived
"legal" obligation but rather only out of a sense of "political" or "moral"
responsibility.
The second approach, is to presume the existence of opinio juris on the
basis of evidence of state practice, or a consensus in the literature and
previous decisions." 7 If this approach is taken, the answer becomes depen-
dent upon state practice, which makes it easier to conclude the existence of
customary international law obligations. Thus, in this case, given the
reasonable certainty of the existence of state practice, use of this approach
shifts the presumption in favour of the presence of opinio juris.
It has, therefore, been demonstrated that "state practice" exists and using
the second method that there is "opinio juris." But, unless specific conduct
can be shown to be positively prohibited by international law, a state will not
be required to refrain from that conduct. In the absence of any guidance by
165. North Sea Continental Shelf, 1969 I.C.J. 4 (Feb. 20).
166. See S.S. Lotus, 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10 at 28 (Sept. 7), and North Sea
Continental Shelf, 1969 I.C.J. 4 (Feb. 20).
167. See North Sea Continental Shelf, 1969 I.C.J. 4 (Feb. 20) (Lachs, J. dissenting).
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a competent tribunal, it cannot be stated if this custom has definitely come
into existence or whether it is still in the process of emergence, "
It is submitted, however, that at least by the latter half of the 1980s, the
supporting structures of these customary international law obligations were
all well affixed. In other words, by that time, all of the major treaties,
agreements and pieces of domestic legislation were functioning. Since then,
moreover, these core elements have been added to and strengthened by the
various measures taken by national governments which translate the
obligations into the domestic sphere. To use an analogy, the foundations of
the building were laid two decades ago with the finalizing of several key
treaties such as the Biological Weapons Convention and Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty. The following decade saw the assembly of the basic
structure and scaffolding, thus strengthening these underlying basic building
blocks. By the end of the 1980s, the "non-proliferation tower" had solidified
with the adoption of the Missile Technology Control Regime, Australia
Group, Zangger Committee and other regimes by domestic legislative and
other administrative steps, all of which contributed to the stability of the
custom.
Therefore, the general customary international law obligations were
binding on states, at the time at which these exports occurred, obligating
them to prevent the export of weapons of mass destruction. However, even
if this is incorrect such that the obligations had not yet emerged at that time,
then considering the developments since the Gulf War it must be clear that
if they have not emerged since then, they are very close to doing so.
Accordingly, keeping all of this in mind, it is now necessary to progress
to an examination of the second component of Article 3, that being whether
there is conduct constituting the breach of these obligations that is attributable
to any of the relevant supplier states.
III. BREACH AND OTHER ELEMENTS
It is now necessary to turn to the second part of Draft Article 3, which
involves the existence of conduct that constitutes a breach of the general
customary international law obligations outlined above. It is also appropriate
to examine two other elements about which Article 3 is completely silent and
which may both be required before a finding of wrongfulness under Article
3 can be concluded. These are first, whether the conduct must be fault based
and second, whether there must be damage suffered by the injured states.
168. S.S. Lotus, 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, at 28 (Sept. 7).
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A. Conduct Constituting Breach of an Obligation
1. "Conduct" and "Result" Obligations
Article 16 of the Draft Articles enunciates the basic proposition that there
is a breach of an international obligation when conduct of a state is not in
conformity with that required of it by that obligation."6 This in turn
depends upon whether the obligation in question is one of either "conduct"
or "result" as outlined respectively by Draft Articles 20 and 21.17
Obligations of conduct, while having a particular object or result require
that object or result to be achieved through action, conduct or means
"specifically determined" by the international obligation itself. 1' Failure
to perform the conduct is sufficient to show the breach of an obliga-
tion-irrespective of whether there were any harmful consequences.
An obligation of result on the other hand, does not require such specific
action. There may be a preference for a certain course of action, but the
state is given the freedom to choose the means to achieve the required result.
If the result is achieved by the state's choice of conduct there is no breach
of the obligation. However, if it is not achieved, the state cannot subse-
quently reply that because it had "hoped" that the steps taken would
adequately achieve the result, it is not guilty of any breach." Neverthe-
less, even if the result is not achieved by the states original choice of
conduct, it is given a "second chance " " to discharge its obligation unless
169. Draft Article 16, supra note 3, at 235: "There is a breach of an international obligation
by a state when an act of that state is not in conformity with what is required of it by that
obligation."
170. See text of articles 20 to 22, with commentaries thereto, adopted by the Commission
at its twenty-ninth session, [1977] 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n (part 2) at 11-30 [hereinafter
Commentaries to Articles 20 and 21].
171. Commentaries to Article 21, supra note 170, para. 8, at 20-21.
172. E.g., Commentary to Article 21, supra note 170, para. 23, at 27:
[A]rticle 2 paragraph 1 of the 1965 International Convention on the Elimination on
all Forms of Racial Discrimination provides that: 'state parties condemn racial
discrimination and undertake to pursue by all appropriate means and without delay
a policy of eliminating racial discrimination in all its forms. . . .' Now it is obvious
that if the administrative authority of a State party to the Convention in fact commits
acts of racial discrimination, the State will not escape the consequences of being
charged with the breach of the Convention by taking refuge behind some law which
it may have enacted prohibiting such acts. It is not sufficient to enact a law, because
if a practice contrary to the obligation is continued, the result intended by the obliga-
tion is not achieved in concreto.
173. See Article 21(2), [1977] Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n (part 2) at 19: "When the conduct of
a state has created a situation not in conformity with the result required of it by an international
obligation, but the obligation allows that this or an equivalent result may nevertheless be
achieved by subsequent conduct of the state, there is a breach of the obligation only if the state
also fails by its subsequent conduct to achieve the result required of it by that obligation."
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the required result has already been rendered "permanently unobtain-
able." 4 In other words, such obligations allow the state to remedy the
situation it earlier created by adopting a different course of conduct capable
of obliterating the consequences of the earlier conduct.
Given this conceptual difference, the main criterion to differentiate
between obligations of conduct and result is that in the former there is a
precise formula of implementation which may either be in the form of a duty
to act or to refrain from action, whereas in the latter this is absent. Because
such precision is much more commonly provided for by a treaty obligation
due to its inherent capacity to verbalize specific demands,175 the general
customary international law obligations with which we are concerned are
more likely to be classified as the result variety.
2. Breach of obligations
In order to determine whether a breach of the general customary
international law obligations has occurred in the present case, it is necessary
to compare the result required with the result achieved in each case.
If we first consider the broad obligation, the result required is the
prevention of the export of all weapons of mass destruction, which can be
achieved by whatever means the state chooses. For example, a state may
legislate, make executive orders, employ more customs police, or instruct its
courts to impose harsher penalties on law breakers. However, even if the
required result is not achieved by these measures, a second chance will still
be granted as long as it has not already been rendered permanently
unobtainable.
The result achieved in this case, however, is that export has already
occurred, specifically from Germany.176 The measures Germany took were
not adequate to achieve the required result. Moreover, as it is extremely
difficult to "recall" these weapons of mass destruction, it seems likely that
the required result has also been rendered permanently unobtainable. If this
is the case, a second chance would not be given. On the other hand, if the
result is still obtainable, for example if the weapons which were exported can
now be neutralized (e.g. by operations of the U.N. Commission instructed
174. For example, if the required result is the protection of foreign diplomatic and consular
staff, the required result is rendered "permanently unobtainable," if those persons are killed as
a consequence of inadequate security measures having been taken by the host state.
175. For example, the Geneva Conventions outline typical conduct obligations in that they
not only require states to take legislative action, they also specify its precise content: "Each
party undertaks to incorporate into its own legislation, in accordance with its constitutional
procedure . . . the uniform law on the international sale of goods ... forming the annexe to the
present convention," Convention Relating to a Uniform Law on the International Sale of Goods,
Aug. 23, 1972, art. 1, para. 1, 834 U.N.T.S. 107.
176. Note that with respect to the former USSR, there is clearly a failure to achieve the
required result as no measures were even taken for its achievement. In fact the direct
governmental involvement in arms sales worked directly against such a result.
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to destroy Iraq's weapons of mass destructionl7", then perhaps a second
chance may still be granted.
Therefore, this comparison has revealed that it is more likely that the
required result has been rendered permanently unobtainable, and thus, at
least on the part of Germany,178 there was in fact conduct constituting the
breach of the broad obligation.
If on the other hand, the obligation is characterized as being the narrow
one, the result required is also the prevention of export of weapons of mass
destruction, but only to those states where it is reasonably foreseeable that
these weapons would be used aggressively. Therefore, like the broad
obligation, the state is given the freedom to choose how to achieve this
result. Similarly, if by those means the result is not achieved, as long as it
has not been rendered permanently unobtainable, the state would be given a
second chance for its achievement. However, unlike the broad obligation,
because this is contingent upon the additional element of "foreseeability," it
is now necessary to discuss that requirement to fully comprehend the
requirements of this obligation.
a. What would have to be foreseen?
What is required, is reasonable foreseeability of the aggressive use of
these weapons, meaning use in a manner which would constitute an "act of
aggression" or "breach of the peace" within the ambit of the U.N. Charter.
A discussion of these concepts is clearly beyond the scope of the present
article, yet the issue still requires a brief explanation. The key is Article 39
of the U.N. Charter which grants the U.N. Security Council power to
determine the existence of any "act of aggression" or "breach of the peace"
and gives it further powers of action under Part VII to deal with such an
outcome.
To aid this determination, the most recent and the most widely
accepted"7 definition of aggression is contained in the UNGA's Definition
of Aggression Resolution," which was intended to offer guidelines to the
U.N. Security Council for use in its deliberations.' Article 1 of that
resolution is the cornerstone, defining aggression as the: "use of armed
force by a state against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political
independence of another state or in any other manner inconsistent with the
charter of the UN." However, the critical point for present purposes is the
foreseeability or likelihood that the state receiving the arms would use them
177. See supra note 20.
178. The USSR's conduct also constituted a breach.
179. See YORAM DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION AND SELF-DEFENSE 120 (1988).
180. G.A. Res. 3314, U.N. GAR 6th Comm 29th Sess. at 142 (1974).
181. Under Articles 10 and I 1 of the U.N. Charter, the UN General Assembly is authorized
to make recommendations to the U.N. Security Council.
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in a manner such that the UN Security Council would conclude that it
constituted an act of aggression.
b. How to test if it was foreseen?
A more difficult question involves defining the test of foreseeability.
Like many other areas of law, there appears to be two tests, one objective
and the other subjective.
The application of an objective test would seem to involve applying a
common set of criteria to the receiving state. These would be factors such
as: 1) The nature of the receiving state's political system and leadership; and
2) Its history of internal repression and aggression." If these show that
it could reasonably have been foreseen that the weapons would be used in an
aggressive manner, then the test would be satisfied. On the other hand, use
of a subjective test requires looking at the supplying state and asking whether
it actually foresaw possible use. This is a more exacting test similar to the
stricter test of opinio juris outlined in The North Sea Shelf Cases. The
questions remains, which test should be used?
As will become evident in the later discussion on fault, it appears that
international law tends to favor the use of the objective test to determine
responsibility. 83 Furthermore, viewing the general evolution of the law
of state responsibility since the beginning of this century, it has gone through
different stages of objectivization in many areas." u Given this trend, it
would therefore seem more appropriate to utilize the objective test.
There is an additional reason to use the objective test. If a subjective
test were used, it would be almost impossible to make a determination that
was not dictated by the supplying states political orientation. For example,
if the receiving state's political philosophy had the goal of terminating
monarchical systems in surrounding states, and the supplying state identified
with that cause, then the supplying state may not have foreseen an act of
aggression, because the destruction of those states would not be considered
"aggression" by that state. An objective test on the other hand would apply
a set of uniform factors to the receiving state making the supplying state's
political orientation irrelevant. Using that approach, it would be foreseeable
that the receiving state would use the arms aggressively.
A determination of the result achieved in this case, involves an
application of the objective test, to determine if it was foreseeable that these
weapons would be used aggressively. First, Iraq is a totalitarian dictatorship
governed by the socialist Baath party, whose rule has been characterized by
182. These are the writer's own opinion.
183. LAN BROWNUIE, SYSTEM OF THE LAW OF NATIONS STATE RESPONSIBILITY (Part 1) 38
(1983) [hereinafter BROWNuIE, STATE RESPONSIBIUTY].
184. Pierre-Marie Dupuy, The International Law of State Responsibility: Revolution or
Evolution?, 11 MICH. J. INT'L L. 105, 127 (1989).
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a brutal record of repression ever since it seized power in 1968.185
Although this perception was impressed on Western populations by the events
of the Gulf War, many had already expressed this conviction years before.
For example, one commentator wrote in 1980: "the Iraqi regime . . . is no
more than the rule of a clique which has survived only through the ruthless
suppression of all potential rivals and opponents, and from which the great
majority of the Iraqi population-Shiites and Kurds-are strongly alienat-
ed., 186
Second, the history of Iraq's internal violence, repression and aggression
are well recorded. A few pertinent examples well known to the international
community will suffice for present purposes. In September 1980, in an act
of aggression under Article 39 of the U.N. Charter, Iraq launched a totally
unprovoked invasion of Iran resulting in the eight year long Iran-Iraq War.
During that war Iraq engaged in an internationally illegal use of chemical
weapons against its enemy. 87 Moreover, in April 1988, Iraq attacked its
own Kurdish population in Halabja with Mustard and Nerve gases indiscrimi-
nately killing and injuring thousands of civilians.'
More specifically in relation to Kuwait, Iraq never fully relinquished its
claim to part if not all of its territory. Iraq and Kuwait have a long history
of boundary disputes. Therefore, the crucial point is that it was clear at least
from the end of the Iran-Iraq war, that Iraq had never fully relinquished its
claims on Kuwait, and that given its past history, pursuit of these ambitions
by the use of force was not an unlikely possibility.
With regard to Israel, it is well known that since Israel's creation in
1948, Iraq continually refused to~recognize its legitimacy, claiming that "the
Zionist entity is not considered a state but a deformed entity occupying an
Arab territory."' Moreover, Iraq committed weapons and troops in three
Arab-Israeli Wars, even though the two countries share no contiguous
borders.'90 In 1949, when the other belligerents agreed to U.N. sponsored
armistice agreements, Iraq refused to enter these negotiations. 191 As a
result, Iraq is still technically at war with Israel. Perhaps the most telling
evidence that an act of aggression against Israel was reasonably foreseeable
185. Majid Khadduri, Iraq's Claim to the Sovereignty of Kuwait, 23 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. &
POL. 5, 31 (1991).
186. Elie Kedourie, The Illusions of Powerlessness, NEW REPUBuC, Nov. 29, 1980, at 17.
187. The findings of the U.N. investigation into Iraq's use of chemical weapons are detailed
by Timothy L.H. McCormack. See generally McCormack, supra note 86.
188. Id. at 17.
189. Contained in a letter sent by the permanent representative of Iraq at the U.N., to the
U.N. Secretary General. U.N. Doc. A/35/110: 5/13516 (27 Feb. 1980) (on file with author).
190. The three wars were: 1949-War of Independence, 1967-Six Day War, and
1973-Yom Kippur War.
191. General Armistice Agreement, Feb. 24, 1949, Israel-Egypt 42 U.N.T.S. 251; General
Armistice Agreement, Israel-Lebanon, 42 U.N.T.S. 287; General Armistice Agreement, Israel-
Jordan, 42 U.N.T.S. 303; General Armistice Agreement, Israel-Syria, 42 U.N.T.S. 327.
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was Saddam Hussein's threat in April 1990 to let his "fire eat half of
Israel." 1" More than anything else this should have triggered alarm in all
supplier states that the weapons being procured by Iraq were not for
defensive but rather aggressive purposes.
In the light of all of these factors, it appears clear that it was reasonably
foreseeable that these weapons would be used in an aggressive manner. Yet
despite this, the relevant supplier states failed to prevent the export of these
weapons to Iraq, rendering the required result unachieved.
This comparison has revealed that, as with the broad obligation, the
required result has now most likely been rendered permanently unobtain-
able," and a second chance to achieve the result would not likely be
granted. Thus, there was conduct that failed to achieve the required result
of preventing the export of weapons of mass destruction to a state when it
was reasonably foreseeable that the weapons would be used aggressively.
B. Attribution of Acts to the State
1. Acts of state
It is not sufficient that there is conduct constituting the breach of an
obligation-it must also be attributable to the state.1" This occurs when
the conduct in question is attributable to a "state organ." 195
The relevant state organs in this context are: 1) The Executive and the
Administration; and 2) The Legislature. The first category includes the acts
of ministers, senior police officers, customs officials, diplomatic agents and
other less senior officials. Whenever misconduct on the part of such persons
in the state service "results in failure of a nation to perform its obligations
under international law, the state must bear responsibility for the wrongful
acts of its servants."'9 The second category involves the legislature, most
commonly in a situation where a treaty creates an obligation to incorporate
certain rules into domestic law and there is a failure to do so.
In attributing an act to a particular organ, it is important to realize that
there are additional situations where state action can be found. First, where
an organ or official of an organ acts ultra vires, as long as they were acting
192. Jill Smolowe, Turning Up the Heat, TIME, Apr. 16, 1990, at 20.
193. In the same way as with respect to the broad obligation.
194. This is also referred to as an "act of state."
195. The governing criteria of a "state organ," is that it must be considered as such under
a domestic law of the state. See Draft Article 5 ("conduct of any State organ having that status
under the internal law of that State shall be considered as an act of the State under international
law, provided that organ was acting in that capacity in the case in question.")
196. Massey Claim (U.S. v. Mex.), 4 R.I.A.A. 155 (1927).
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within the actual or apparent scope of their authority their acts will be
attributable to the state.' 97
Second, because it is often impossible to specify the particular conduct
that is the source of the breach, the act of state is said to consist of a
combination of a number of factors (e.g. legislative and administrative). In
such a case, the issue becomes the general policy of implementation of the
obligation, and not the acts of particular state organs. The Corfu Channel
Case'" is such an example. In that case the source of the act was a
combination of several unidentifiable omissions by different Albanian state
organs (military, executive, legislature) that resulted in a failure to warn
British ships of the existence of mines in their waters. Despite the impossi-
bility of specific attribution, this did not prevent the finding of an act
attributable to the state.'9
Finally, when a state organ approves and adopts the harmful acts of
private persons, those acts will become attributable to the state organ.
Indeed, this was held to be the case in the Hostages Case,' where the
Court concluded that: "the approval given to these [acts] by the Ayatollah
Khomeini and other organs of the Iranian state and the decision to perpetuate
them, translated the continuing occupation of the Embassy and detention of
the hostages into acts of that state. "2° Therefore, bearing these consider-
ations in mind, it is necessary to determine whether the conduct constituting
the breach of these general customary international law obligations in the
present case, are in fact attributable to a state organ.
2. Application of these principles to the factual context
As previously stated, different governments were involved in Iraq's arms
acquisitions on several different levels. Where there was direct involvement,
for example by the former USSR, there were clearly acts of state, because
all industry in the former USSR was centrally controlled by the state. But
what about where there was simply awareness?
In those cases, it is still possible that there were acts attributable to the
state as discussed above. First, in the case of Germany, it seems clear that
the German Federal Ministry of Economic Affairs and the Federal Office of
the Economy in approving export licenses and export guarantees, performed
acts of state (even if the acts were ultra vires) because they were performed
197. Draft Article 10. See also BROWNUE, STATE RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 183, at 145
(citing STRUPP, ELEMENTS DU DROIT, INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 329 (2d ed. 1930).
198. Corfu Channel, 1949 I.C.J. 4.
199. Another similar example is the allegation found in the Belgium submissions in the
Barcelona Traction Case that there were general failures on the part of the Spanish administra-
tive and judicial authorities to comply with certain international obligations. Barcelona Traction,
1970 I.C.J. 4.
200. United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran), 1980 I.C.J. 4.
201. Id. at 36.
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within the scope of either actual or apparent authority. Second, it may be
argued, either additionally or alternatively, that the act of state in question
was the failure of the legislature to adequately legislate to ensure that the
result required by certain international obligations was achieved.
Third, it is most likely that, as in the Corfu Channel Case, the act of
state emerges from a multiplicity of factors. In other words, the act is not
specifically attributable to any one state organ, but rather, stems from a
general failure to implement a system of export laws. Thus, in that case,
despite the difficulty of specific attribution, there should nonetheless be no
impediment to concluding there was an act (or more specifically an omission)
of state. Finally, if in failing to prevent the export of these weapons the acts
were originally those of private persons followed by a continuing failure to
prevent the exportation from occurring, there was an adoption of those acts
by the relevant state organs in an analogous manner to the Hostages Case.
Thus, in addition to the existence of conduct constituting the breach of the
general obligations, it is also attributable to state organs.
C. Fault
1. Fault based liability versus strict liability
Despite the existence of the above elements, because there is no mention
of "fault" in the Draft Articles, there remains a continuing controversy as to
the exact "mental state" or degree of advertence required for the existence
of wrongfulness under Article 3. On the one hand, it is argued by many that
wrongfulness arises from the failure to fulfil the content of the obligation
alone (in other words strict liability).' However, it is also asserted that
an essential condition for the existence of wrongfulness is fault (either intent
or negligence).
When writers and publicists have written on this topic, they have tended
to adhere to either one of these approaches as a generally applicable
principle. Grotius for example, the architect of fault based liability wrote:
"That anyone without fault of his own is bound by acts of his agents is not
a part of the law of nations."' Anzilotti, on the other hand, formulated
a theory of "absolute liability" which said that wrongfulness can never be
conditioned on fault.' Yet, a superior view seems to be that the question
of fault "will not depend upon a general principle but upon the precise
formulation of each obligation in international law." 5 Thus, for example,
if an obligation were to require all states "not to intentionally destroy rain
202. This is otherwise known as "objective responsibility."
203. SIR HERSCH LAUTERPACHT, PRIVATE LAW SOURCES AND ANALOGIES OF INTERNATION-
AL LAW 135 (1970).
204. Id at 137-38.
205. BROWNLIE, STATE RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 183, at 40.
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forests," then it is clear that fault (intent) is an essential part of the content
of that obligation.
It, therefore, appears pointless to embark upon an examination of the
question of fault versus strict liability framed in global terms. The answer
in each case depends upon the precise content of the obligation in question.
However, where there is no indication as to the degree of fault required with
respect to a particular obligation, a general rule or presumption will be
significant."
In this regard, Lauterpacht, claiming historical support, 2°7 takes the
view that: "It is believed that the [fault theory] corresponds with the
conception of States as moral entities accountable for their acts and
omissions-a conception which must form the foundation of any legal theory
of responsibility.""J8
Lauterpacht cites further support' for this proposition from the Corfu
Channel Case,20 where the International Court of Justice (ICJ) held that
Albania was responsible for the damage to British war ships on the basis of
its knowledge of the laying of mines.
However, this viewpoint is unconvincing for two reasons. First, the
Corfu Channel Case was set in the context of a particular obligation, which
was that "every state's obligation not to knowingly allow its territory to be
used for acts contrary to the rights of other states."21" ' Just because a
constituent element of the content of that obligation involved fault does not
necessarily mean that fault governs all questions of responsibility.2 2
Second, contrary to Lauterpacht's view: "It is believed that the practice of
states, the jurisprudence of arbitral tribunals and the international court have
followed the theory of objective responsibility as a general principle (which
may be modified or excluded in certain cases)." 21 3
Under this view a state bears:
responsibility for those acts committed by its officials or organs which they
are bound to perform, despite the absence of fault on their part . . .
However, in order to justify the admission of this objective responsibility,
it is necessary that the officials or organs should have acted as authorized
officials or organs."'
206. Id. at 40-41.
207. LAUTERPACHT, supra note 203, at 134.
208. Id. at 137.
209. SIR HERSCH LAUTERPACHT, THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW BY THE
INTERNATIONAL COURT 88-89 (1982).
210. Corfu Channel, 1949 I.C.J. 4.
211. Id. at 22.
212. BROWNUE, STATE RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 183, at 43.
213. Id. at 39; see also BIN CHENG, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF LAW 218-32 (1987).
214. Estate of Jean-Baptiste Caire (France) v. United Mexican States, 5 R.I.A.A. 516, 529-
31 (1929).
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Although it seems that fault is not a general condition of liability, it will,
however, play an important role in certain contexts where there is insufficient
guidance to the existence of fault in the content of a particular obligation.
Brownlie for example, cites obligations to control certain activities and
suggests that in this type of case, questions of knowledge or awareness may
be important in establishing an omission to act. This may be established in
two ways-direct and constructive knowledge." 5  In the Corfu Channel
Case, the court utilized the latter and concluded that it was not possible that
the laying of the minefield could have been accomplished without the knowl-
edge of the Albanian Government. 1 6
In summary, the clearest approach to fault can be stated in several
propositions:
1. The need for fault is guided by the particular obligation in
question.
2. If there is no indication as to the degree of fault in that obligation,
look at the general rule.
3. The general rule seems to apply objective responsibility.
4. If the obligation involves the necessity to control certain
activities-knowledge or awareness may be an important factor.
In light of these principles, it is necessary to analyze the general customary
international law obligations to see if fault is a further prerequisite of
wrongfulness under Article 3 in this case.
2. Application of these principles to the factual context
Because neither of the general customary international law obligations
offer particular indications as to the presence of fault,217 it is necessary to
resort to the general rule of objective responsibility. In applying the general
rule there appears to be wrongfulness by virtue of result alone. However,
because these are obligations to control certain activities, knowledge may be
an important factor in the present factual context. Whether or not states
were aware that arms were being exported has already been addressed,
resulting in the conclusion that a positive finding of constructive knowledge
would be made.
In summary, if fault is not viewed as a requirement of either of the
general obligations, the issue of fault is irrelevant. However, if it is
215. See supra Government Involvement and Awareness, see. I.B.
216. Corfu Channel, 1949 I.C.J. at 18, 22. Note that "knowledge" in that case was part
of the content of the particular obligation.
217. At this point, an explanatory note is needed so as to avoid confusion. Although the
concept of foresecability as explained with respect to this narrow obligation may at first glance
appear similar to conceptions of fault, it is actually very different. Foreseeability as described
constitutes part of the content of the obligation. The question of fault, on the other hand,
involves asking whether or not in addition to the foreseeability of weapon use, the state also
needs to intentionally or negligently supply arms. Hence, to use a domestic law analogy,
"foreseeability" is a part of the "actus reus," while fault relates to the "mens rea."
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required, wrongfulness would depend upon the knowledge of the export of
weapons of mass destruction in either the direct or constructive senses.
D. Damage
Draft Article 3 does not mention the issue of damage, thus it is necessary
to question whether it is also a precondition for the existence of an interna-
tionally wrongful act.
It is possible to place damage into three categories. First, there is
"material" or "economic" damage which will exist where the wrongful act
results in a loss which is capable of exact financial calculation. Second,
there is "moral" or "political" damage which is less specific and for which
the award of compensation is not quantifiable.218 Lastly, there is "legal"
damage which is the result of the actual breach of the international obligation
alone. It is assumed that an obligation imposed on one state corresponds
with the subjective rights of others, thus the mere breach of an obligation
violates those subjective rights resulting in "legal" damage. 29 Further, the
violation of the subjective rights of others, irrespective of some tangible
injury will be a sufficient basis for wrongfulness under Article 3.1
Therefore, sufficient damage will always exist where there is a wrongful
act-because "legal" damage is not an "element distinct from, but rather a
constituent element of""1 such an act. Hence, the issue of what damage
was suffered by the materially injured state is more related to the "conse-
quence of responsibility" to be discussed below. In other words, whether or
not the injured state suffered "legal," "moral," or "material" damage, will
effect the locus standi that state may have in order to seek a remedy, but it
will not detract from the existence of a wrongful act.
Therefore, as there was a violation of the general customary international
law obligations in this case, there was also a corresponding violation of
subjective rights and thus sufficient damage for the existence of a wrongful
act.
E. Summary
In summary, it has been demonstrated that there was conduct on the part
of the relevant supplier states that constituted the breach of the general
218. See IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 458 (3d ed. 1979).
For example, the violation of diplomatic immunities or trespass in the territorial sea. Id. at 457-
58.
219. See Atilla Tanzi, Is Damage a Distinct Condition for the Existence of an Internationally
Wrongful Act?, in UNITED NATIONS CODIFICATION OF STATE RESPONSIBILITY 1, 8 (Marina
Spinedi & Bruno Simma eds., 1987).
220. Id. at 8; see also Bernhardt Graefrach, Responsibility and Damages Caused:
Relationship between Responsibility and Damages, 185 REC. DES. CouPs 34 (1984-lI) (on file
with author).
221. Commentary to Draft Articles YBILC (1973) 11 183-184.
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customary international law obligations, and at least in the cases of Germany
and the former USSR, that conduct was shown to be attributable to the state.
In addition, the two other preconditions of fault and damage were also
analyzed. With regard to fault, we concluded that if it is required in the
context of these obligations, it requires actual or constructive awareness (the
presence of which is almost certain in the present circumstances). With
regard to the latter, "legal" damage (which is necessarily present in this case
by virtue of the violation of the subjective rights of others) was shown to be
a sufficient precondition for the existence of wrongfulness.
The only conclusion that can be reached in light of these factors is that
there is wrongfulness on the part of Germany, the former USSR and possibly
the other supplier states in the sense prescribed by Article 3 of the Draft
Articles. With this conclusion in mind, it is now necessary to consider
whether there is also any wrongfulness under Draft Article 27, or any
indirect aggression.
IV. ARTICLE 27 AND INDIRECT AGGRESSION 222
A. Article 27
Whereas a wrongful act under Article 3 depends upon the breach of an
international obligation, Article 27 will imply wrongfulness where conduct,
although not in itself a violation of an obligation, aids or assists another state
to commit an internationally wrongful act.' This will occur when the
following three elements are present.
1. Existence of the Principal Act
The existence of wrongful participation is necessarily dependent upon the
existence of a principal internationally wrongful act, that is, an act by the
assisted state which is wrongful under Draft Article 3. The present context
demonstrates the presence of several such acts on the part of Iraq. Of
primary importance is Iraq's breach of the prohibition on the use of force in
Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter.' In addition, Iraq has also breached
several other obligations:
222. Supplier states are now referred to as "participating states"-i.e., they participate in
the wrongful act of another state.
223. Draft article 27, supra note 3 ("Aid or assistance by a State to another State, if it is
established that it is rendered for the Commission of an internationally wrongful act even if,
taken alone, such aid or assistance would not constitute the breach of an international obliga-
tion. ").
224. In fact, such a breach of an international obligation would actually constitute an
international crime, as it constitutes "the breach of an international obligation so essential for
the protection of fundamental interests of the international community that its breach is
recognized as a crime. ... " Draft Article 19, supra note 3.
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(a) In clandestinely attempting to assemble nuclear weapons it breached
Article III of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty;
(b) Assuming the Biological Weapons Convention is probably norm-
creating,' Iraq's efforts to produce biological weapons violated that
international obligation; and
(c) Use of chemical weapons in the Iran-Iraq War was clearly in
contravention of the Geneva Protocol.226
2. Aid or Assistance
The second element requires that the conduct of the participating state
must actually "aid or assist" the primary act. In this regard, if it is
presumed that Iraq's principal act is the act of aggression, then the examples
of aid or assistance illustrated by the ILC are pertinent. First, is the
placement of territory at the disposal of another state for it to use in
perpetrating an act of aggression against a third state. 27  Second, and
perhaps more importantly it notes that: "another classic and frequently cited
example of complicity is that of a state that supplies another with weapons
to attack a third state."28
This example is most relevant if Iraq's principal act is characterized as
an act of aggression. However, this example is also relevant in many other
situations, so that supply of weapons to aid in the breach of any obligation
would also, no doubt, constitute aid or assistance.
There is an important distinction here, because most states (apart from
the former USSR) merely acquiescing in the supply or assisted by conduct
of omission rather than commission. However, it appears likely that this can
also be classified as aid or assistance because of the dual meaning given to
the word "conduct" throughout the Draft Articles.' Moreover, this
acquiescence may also be said to constitute aid or assistance by virtue of an
adoption by the state of the conduct of those private persons, similar to the
adoption of the conduct of private persons in the context of Article 3.'
3. Intent
In addition to having materially facilitated the perpetration of the
international offence by the other state, in order to imply a wrongful act the
conduct must also have been intended to enable its commission:
225. See supra note 82.
226. Id.
227. See Definition of Aggression Resolution, G.A. Res. 3314, U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess.,
2319 mtg., at 393 (art. 3(f)) (1974).
228. Id.
229. See Draft Article 3, supra note 3 (defining "conduct" as including both acts and
omissions. Thereafter, the Draft Articles merely refer to "conduct.").
230. See United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Teheran, 1980 I.C.J. 33.
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The very idea of 'aid or assistance' to another state for the commission of
an internationally wrongful act, necessarily presupposes an intent to collab-
orate in the execution of an act of this kind... and hence knowledge of
the specific purpose for which the state receiving certain supplies intends
to use them. '
Application of this requires proof that the supplier states actually
acquiesced in the supply to Iraq with more than merely reckless disregard or
negligence. What is required is an intention to collaborate in either: (a) the
invasion of Kuwait; (b) breach of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty; (c)
breach of the Biological Weapons Convention; or (d) contravention of the
Geneva Protocol. In light of the analysis in previous sections, however,
where it was shown that the only fault present in the supplier state's conduct
was either direct or constructive awareness, it seems clear that the intent
required by this element is not present in this case.
Therefore, in conclusion, it seems unlikely that a wrongful act may be
said to exist via Article 27.
B. Indirect Aggression
Aside from Article 27 there is the overlapping and almost identical
concept of "indirect aggression" which is generally given two main meanings
by international lawyers. First, there are those who illustrate the concept by
reference to acts taken against another state involving an indirect or vicarious
use of force by third parties. 2 The supply of weapons by one state to an
aggressor would serve as such an example, as would aiding rebels within
another state or the sending of armed bands to another's territory .1 3 It
should be noted that some of these examples are now embodied in the
Definition of Aggression Resolution adopted by the UNGA.' However,
the consequence of such acts would differ from Article 27, in that, if such
an act is established and there is control by the state over the third party,
instead of there being a wrongful act, there will in fact be an act of
aggression by the assisting state.
Second, there are writers and publicists who speak of:
the increasingly numerous forms of attack upon the integrity of a state by
other than the traditional means of military attack. . . . These range from
the many types of ideological and political propaganda and psychological
warfare, by radio, by aerial leaflets etc. to the organization of subversive,
political movements inside another country, the systematic infiltration of
231. Report of the Commission to the General Assembly on the Work of its Thirtieth
Session, [1978] 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 62, U.N. Doc. A./CN.41SER.AII978/Add. I (Part 2)
(emphasis added).
232. ANN V.W. THOMAS & A.J. THOMAS, JR., THE CONCEPT OF AGGRESSION IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW 65 (1972).
233. IAN BROWNUE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES 369 (1963).
234. E.g. Art. 3(g).
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political agents and the systematic strangulation of a regime by comprehen-
sive trade boycott."
The literature is considerably vague as to the precise consequence of
these acts. Some would simply label it "aggression, " ' yet others com-
plain that this is "liable to extend the concept of aggression indefinitely, " '
citing omission of these acts from the Definition ofAggression Resolution as
support for this view.
In the ultimate analysis however, like Article 27, the essence of both of
these concepts of "indirect aggression" is the presence of intention and a
deliberateness to undermine the security of another state. In the absence of
this it is, therefore, difficult to argue that the act should be categorized as
"aggression."
Therefore, in this case, the conclusion from the analysis of Article 27 is
equally applicable. Even though, prima facie, the supply of weapons to an
aggressor would constitute an act of indirect aggression, this conclusion is
negated by the absence of deliberateness on the part of those supplying states
to either commit an act of aggression or directly "strangle" the injured states
by non-military means. As a consequence, the foregoing analysis reveals
that in the present case, it cannot be stated that the omissions of the supplier
states were wrongful under Article 27 or indirect aggression because of the
absence of deliberateness or intent.
Nevertheless, it must be remembered that this does not detract in any
way from the presence of any wrongfulness that may exist through the
Article 3 type analysis. Therefore, it is to that form of wrongfulness that it
is now necessary to return in order to consider its legal consequences.
V. CONSEQUENCES OF A WRONGFUL ACT
Having examined the determinants of an internationally wrongful act,
consideration will now be given to the proposition that the consequence of
every such act is to entail the state's international responsibility."' Simply,
this means that the defendant state is obliged to make reparation to the
"injured state" in an adequate form. 23
235. FRIEDMANN, supra note 12, at 262.
236. THOMAs & THOMAS, supra note 232, at 88-89.
237. THOMAS & THOMAS, supra note 232, at 88-89.
238. Draft Article 1: "Every internationally wrongful act of a state entails the international
responsibility of that state."
239. Factory at Chorz6w ,(F.R.G. v. Pol.), 1928 P.C.I.J., (ser. A) No. 13, at 21-23 (Sept.
13).
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A. Remedies
All remedies in international law are covered by the generic term
"reparation" and their object is to: "wipe out as far as possible all the conse-
quences of the illegal act and re-establish the situation which would, in all
probability, have existed if that act had not been committed."'
There are three main types of reparation: compensation, restitution, and
satisfaction. Compensation refers to the payment of money as a valuation of
the wrong done,"1 while restitution involves actual restoring the parties to
their original position.
Satisfaction, on the other hand, may be defined: "as any measure which
the author of a breach is bound to take under customary law or under an
agreement by the parties to a dispute, apart from compensation or restitu-
tion."2 These measures which are essentially "moral" or "political" will
include: the taking of steps to prevent recurrence of the wrongful act,
apologies, or the acknowledgement of wrongdoing by other means.
Bearing this in mind, both Kuwait and Israel would most likely be
seeking a mixture of satisfaction and compensation type remedies. First,
acknowledgement of the wrongdoing would be sought, either as an apology
or perhaps in the form of a token payment.3' The only restraint on such
demands are that the measures should not be humiliating or excessive.'
Second, there would no doubt be a request for immediate measures to be
taken to tighten export controls to prevent recurrence of the wrongful acts.
Finally, compensation would most likely be requested for the material
damage suffered.
This last demand would be difficult to satisfy because of the problem of
its quantification. In the average claim for compensation:
The duty to make reparation extends only to those damages which are
legally regarded as the consequences of an unlawful act. These are
damages which would normally flow from such an act, or which a
reasonable man in the position of the wrongdoer would have foreseen as
likely to result .... 4
In the current context, it would have had to have been foreseen that the
consequence of failing to prevent the export of weapons of mass destruction
would be damage of the type Kuwait and Israel suffered. This is intimately
240. Id. at 47.
241. BROWNUE, supra note 75, at 458.
242. Id. at 46.
243. As for example where the U.S., even though ordered not to pay compensation to
Canada, was required to pay the sum of $25,000 to the Canadian Government "to apologize to
His Majesty's Canadian Government therefore," I'm Alone Case, 1935 R.I.A.A. iii 1609.
244. BROWNUE, supra note 75, at 460-61.
245. CHENG, supra note 213, at 253; see also The Angola Case, Award 1, 1928 R.I.A.A.
11 1011.
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connected with the analysis of foreseeability discussed previously. If (as
concluded there) it was foreseeable that the weapons would be used in an
aggressive manner, then this would also suggest that the resulting damage
from such use would also have been foreseen, thus making it a proper claim
for compensation.
Conversely however, it is clear that much of the damage caused to
Kuwait was simply not foreseeable. Was it a foreseeable consequence of the
failure to control non-conventional weapons exports to Iraq, that Iraq would
use conventional explosives to destroy Kuwait's oil wells? This clearly
appears to be an inadmissible extension of responsibility because only
damage from the use of non-conventional weapons could have been foreseen.
Assuming that these would be the types of remedies sought, we now
need to examine how the injured state might seek such redress.
B. Forum
1. Preliminary Observations
At this point, before surveying the forums in which such reparation
could be sought, it is worth observing that in fact, such remedies were in
essence already partly made to the injured states. At the peak of the Gulf
crisis for example, Germany undertook the following measures with respect
to Israel:
(1) It made promises that it would tighten its export regulations;'
(2) It advanced $213 million in "Emergency Aid"; 247 and
(3) It agreed to send substantial military aid." 8
With respect to Kuwait-supplier states essentially tried to make good their
"wrong" by rescuing Kuwait from virtual liquidation. However, as
significant as these measures are in politically satisfying the injured states,
they do not acknowledge any wrongful or illegal activity.
In that sense, this case is very similar to the Nuclear Tests Case.249
There, Australia sought both a cessation of atmospheric nuclear testing by
France, and a judgement declaring such tests to be inconsistent with
international law. The majority held that because France had agreed to cease
testing and had given an undertaking to that effect, the "dispute" had
246. Jonathan Karp, Germany and France Move to Soothe Israel, THE AGE, Jan. 26, 1991,
at 7.
247. Richard Murphy, Kohl Promises Allies Cash and $213m for Israel, THE AUSTRALIAN,
Jan. 25, 19 9 1, at 6.
248. Germany advanced $A870m in military aid for Israel, including two submarines and
equipment such as the Fox armored cars for the detection of chemical weapons. See Forbes,
supra note 52, at 8.
249. Nuclear Tests (Austl. v. Fr.), 1974 I.C.J. 253 (Dec. 20).
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resolved itself, no further judicial action was required.' However, the
minority, 5' in a vigorous dissent, concluded that:
In our view the dispute between the parties has not disappeared since it has
concerned, from its origin, the question of the legality of the tests....
It is true that from a factual point of view, the extent of the dispute is
reduced.., but from a legal point of view, the question which remains in
dispute is whether the atmospheric nuclear tests which were in fact
conducted in 1973 and 1974 were consistent with the rule of international
law.2
52
A declaratory judgement would have answered this question, it would
have given Australia the legal "satisfaction" it requested in its application.
Similarly in the present case, if the injured states sought further vindication
of their claims in addition to political satisfaction, they would have to pursue
one of the traditional methods of dispute settlement.
2. Methods of Dispute Settlement25
3
The principle methods of dispute settlement involve Negotiation, Good
Offices, Arbitration and Judicial settlement.' The final two differ
significantly in that the parties will be legally bound by the decision of a
third party. Because the first three methods are essentially political in
nature, and Arbitration depends specifically upon the appointment of an
arbitrator, our attention will be focussed on Judicial settlement, which
involves recourse to the I.C.J. Access to that forum requires the Court to
have jurisdiction to hear the case, as well as standing on the part of the
plaintiff state.
With regard to the first requirement, in order for the I.C.J. to hear either
Israel's or Kuwait's case, it must have either "conventional" 2 5 or "compul-
sory" " jurisdictions granted to it by Articles 36(1) and 36(2) respectively
of the Statute of the L C.J. Considering first Article 36(1), if the defendant
state agreed to refer the matter to the I.C.J., jurisdiction would be acquired
over the dispute. However, this is unlikely to occur. Furthermore, this is
not a matter specifically provided for under any other treaty or convention
250. Id. at 271, para. 56.
251. Id. at 312-19 (separate opinion of Judge Onyeama, et al.).
252. Id. at 319, para 19.
253. U.N. Charter art. 33. Under Article 33 of the U.N. Charter, the parties to any dispute
are obliged to seek a peaceful settlement by means of their own choice.
254. JULIUS STONE, LEGAL CONTROLS OF INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT 67 (1954).
255. That is, it will have jurisdiction over "all cases which the parties refer to it and all
matters specifically provided for in the charter of the U.N. or in treaties and conventions in
force."
256. It enables the Court to hear all legal disputes between States that have declared "as
compulsory ipso facto and without special agreement in relation to any other State accepting the
same obligation, the jurisdiction of the Court."
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in force. Accordingly, we need to turn to Article 36(2). There is also a
difficulty with this alternative because none of the states concerned-Israel,
Kuwait, Germany, France, Italy, the U.S. or the former USSR-presently
recognize the jurisdiction of the Court. 7
Therefore in this case, it appears there exists no possibility of Judicial
settlement. The question of standing, even though a legally important and
complicated question, merely becomes a moot point. Further, unless an
arbitrator can be appointed, the only forum to address the issue is an
essentially political one.
C. Swnmary
In summary, there are a number of types of reparation available that
might be sought by injured states in various different forums. Unfortunately,
however, the analysis above can only lead to the conclusion that the solution
to such a dispute is essentially political. Moreover, in view of the fact that
the ICJ, is in essence, representative of the role of international law in
international relations, its importance in the context of this issue is quite
symbolic. Despite this, it must still be kept in mind that although the legal
effect here is unsatisfying, this does not mean that international law on this
point is non-existent. In other words, just because an injured state would
have difficulty achieving a remedy, this does not detract from the existence
of a wrongful act or lessen the effect that this may have in deterring future
wrong-doers.'-
CONCLUSION
The foregoing analysis has revealed a number of legal conclusions.
First, it was demonstrated that the two components required for the existence
of wrongfulness under Article 3 were present, at least with respect to
Germany and the former USSR. That is, it was demonstrated that there are
international obligations that bind states to prevent the export of weapons of
mass destruction either erga omnes or merely to some states, and, that these
obligations were breached by conduct consisting of acts and omissions,
attributable to the state organs of these states.
Second, because neither of these states harbored any intention to
undermine the security of either Kuwait or Israel, these acts or omissions
257. See 1978-88 I.C.J. YEARBOOK 62. n.l. Israel, France and the U.S. have all withdrawn
their declarations of acceptance, while Kuwait, Germany and the former USSR never made any
at al.
258. At this point, it would be worthwhile providing some suggestions as to how
international law might strengthen its enforcement machinery with respect to these anti-
proliferation obligations. Unfortunately, however, this discussion is beyond the boundaries of
this article.
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cannot be characterized as either wrongful under Article 27 or as "indirect
aggression. "
Finally, it was demonstrated that the consequence of this wrongfulness
is to engage the international responsibility of these states and to require the
provision of some form of reparation, be it either compensation, restitution
or satisfaction. However, in this case, it was shown that the means to
achieve such reparation would be limited to non-judicial forums due to the
ICJ's lack of jurisdiction. Accordingly, despite the existence of substantive
wrongs under international law, procedural hurdles would frustrate
facilitation of any such redress, rendering the resolution of any such dispute
dependent on political rather than legal considerations.
It is the placement of this entire issue within the framework of such
political realities that leads to another conclusion which is more far reaching
in its effect upon the future of non-conventional arms proliferation. For in
a sense, the elements of this case crystallize the essence of the debate
between realism and idealism in international affairs. On the one hand,
classic realists such as Morgenthau would argue that "The struggle for power
is universal in time and space and is an undeniable fact of experience. It
cannot be denied that throughout historic time, regardless of social, economic
and political conditions, states have met each other in contests for pow-
er."29
On this view, because non-conventional armaments represent a crucial
element in the attainment of such power, international law would be
overridden by this reality and denied an effective role in the regulation and
control of these weapons. Indeed, many have expressed the opinion that the
ICJ's implicit refusal to deal with the politically important issue of nuclear
testing in the Nuclear Tests Case' reflects such an appreciation on its
part.26'
On the other hand, however, idealists would argue that such realism
viewed on its own is a flawed perception because realism divorced from
idealism is likely to be self-defeating and counterproductive to a state's
national interests and would lead to stagnation in its development and
relations with other states. It is in that sense that international law acts as an
important restraint upon the forces of realism and pushes forward the
processes of consensus and cooperation. It is this conception that led
Schachter to conclude that: "power is, so to speak absorbed and in a degree
transcended by an arrangement in which common standards and rules are
259. He defines power to mean man's control over the acts and minds of other men. HANS
J. MORGENTHAU, POUTICS AMONG NATIONS 4, 31 (4th ed., 1967).
260. Nuclear Tests, 1974 I.C.J. 253.
261. See Pierre Lellouche, The International Court of Justice, The Nuclear Tests Cases:
Judicial Silence v. Atomic Blasts, 16 HARV. INT'L L.J. 614 (1975).
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reciprocally observed and implemented by [the] institutional mechanism of
international law."Z 2
Therefore, perhaps in contrast to the stark pessimism of realpolitik, a
more satisfactory analytical and normative view is that international law is
an effective controlling influence upon the action of states in their pursuit of
political power. This is important because it shows that when international
law proposes rules for the regulation of a state's conduct, any state that acts
in their violation is not acting in its own best interests.
Similarly, in this case, this leads to the conclusion that the existence of
obligations to prevent the export of weapons of mass destruction does much
more than simply govern the present dispute. It places an important warning
on other states concerning their future conduct and demonstrates that by
avoiding the breach of these international obligations, they will ensure their
own best interests and avoid international opprobrium. Therefore, the major
importance of international legal obligations such as those considered in this
article is to achieve a result whereby "most nations will observe most rules
for most of the time. "' For it is only the clarification of such recognized
rules of international behavior, coupled with a decrease in ideological and
political tensions, that will help restrain the naked pursuit for power, and
enable it to be channelled in directions that help preserve the most basic
human interests of peace and security.
262. Oscar Schachter, The Structure and Purpose of International Law, in THE STRUCTURE
AND PROCESS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 745, 753 (R. St. J. MacDonald & Douglas M. Johnston
eds., 1983).
263. Louis HENKIN, How NATIONS BEHAVE 47 (2d ed. 1979).
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APPENDIX
Type of Obligation Source Whom it Why
Weapon binds
Biological l.Not to use Geneva Protocol 1925 All P & NP Binds NP because
Weapons it is accepted that
Gen. Protoc. is
norm-creating-
2.Not to Article IM biological All P & NP will be bound
transfer, assist weapon Conven. Possibly NP if this is seen as
induce, -norm creating-
encourage
3.Not to Article I biological All P & As above
produce weapon Conven. Possibly NP
Chemical I.Not to use Geneva Protocol 1925 All P & NP As for biological
Weapons weapons use
2.Not to Custom or emerging custom. All state If the custom exists
transfer, assist Evidence(i) Chemical as a rule of
induce, Weapons Convention, rolling customary
encourage text' (ii) Paris Declaration international law, it(iii) Canberra Conf. will prima facie bind
Declaration (iv) Australia all states
Group Agreement (v) SC
Resolutions (vi) Widespread
Domestic Legislation (vii)
Policy Initiatives &
Announcements
Ballistic 1.Not to Custom or emerging custom All states Unsure if custom as
Missiles transfer yet
Nuclear 1.Not to Articles I and El Nuclear All P to It seems unlikely
Weapons transfer, assist Non-Proliferation Treaty Nuclear Non- that the Nuclear
induce, or Proliferation Non-Proliferation
encourage Custom Treaty - Treaty is
Evidence - (i) Nuclear probably not norm-creating
Non-Proliferation Treaty (ii) NP
Nuclear Supplier Guidelines
and Nuclear Exporters All states (i.e.:
Committee (iii) SC Resolution would bind P
(iv) Domestic Legislation & NPs to
Nuclear Non-
Proliferation
Treaty)
2.Not to Article I Nuclear Non- All P to Unlikely that Nuclear
Produce Proliferation Treaty Nuclear Non- Non-Proliferation
Proliferation Treaty is
Treaty - norm-creating
probably not
NP
*P=Paries, NP-Non-Parties
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